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A series of articles were published in leading Chinese periodicals on the eve of the Tenth Congress of the Communist Party of China, laying down guidelines for the study of world history and of the modern and contemporary history of China. These articles indicate that propaganda of the Maoist conception of history has become an important part of Peking's ideological and political campaign both inside and outside the country.

The Maoists, having suffered a major setback in their venture to promote the ideas of Mao Tse-tung abroad as the most correct revolutionary theory of today, are now trying to make up for their failure by engaging in "historical studies."

The choice of historiography as a means of spreading Maoism is not accidental. Misrepresentation of the main development of modern and contemporary history in conformity with Maoist "thought" has always held an important place in the attempts of the Peking leaders to impose an anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist ideology on the Chinese people. The Maoists inherited this channel of political influence from the ruling classes of old China, the only country in the

world where the compiling of chronicles of dynasties for the glorification of the "historical rightness" and "wisdom" of the emperors was a matter of paramount national importance.

What the Maoists are trying to do is to set forth the "ideas" of Mao Tse-tung inside and, in particular, outside China as a universal theory of world history and the world revolutionary movement at the present stage. They reject the division of world history into modern and contemporary history as adopted by Marxist-Leninists. And they deny the importance of such historical landmarks as the French revolution of 1789, the Paris Commune and, finally, the 1917 Socialist Revolution in Russia. Maoist ideologists claim that the events of China in the mid-19th century, that is, the initial steps of the Chinese people's struggle against the colonialists, actually ushered in an era of major revolutionary changes in the world.

The period has been chosen deliberately in an attempt to prove that at a time when the Marxist theory of world history appeared in capitalist Europe, in China conditions were shaping up for the rise of a "special," "original" concept of social development; that is, objective conditions were being created for the emergence of the "ideas" of Mao Tse-tung.

The Maoists use this contention to explain "theoretically" their break with Marxism-Leninism, their substitution of the unscientific "ideas" of Mao for the Marxist-Leninist teaching.

The Tenth Congress of the Communist Party of China, which took place in August 1973, showed that the Chinese leaders' theoretical

stand remained the same and that their policy had not changed either. The Tenth Congress was guided by nationalistic, anti-Soviet slogans and provided yet another proof of the Chinese leadership's departure from Marxism-Leninism, the world communist movement and the socialist community.

This book is a collection of essays by Soviet historians and philosophers. They offer a critical analysis of the chief Maoist concepts of social and historical development from the Marxist-Leninist standpoint, and show the logical connection between the unscientific character of these concepts and the Chinese leaders' anti-socialist domestic and foreign policies.

The first article in this book discusses Mao's outlook in general and his philosophical views, exposing their untenability from the standpoint of theory and practice.

The other, main articles show how the Maoist ideologists, basing themselves on Mao's ideas, falsify world history and the history of China of the modern and contemporary periods.

Contradictory Justifications of a Contradictory Policy

F. Burlatsky

THE SOURCES OF MAOISM

In one of his latest works Mao Tse-tung admitted that for a long time he had adhered to wrong views. In the booklet "On the Question of Correctly Resolving Contradictions Within the People," published in 1957, he wrote: "Formerly I had held non-Marxist views, and only later I came to accept Marxism. I had studied Marxism a little from books and took my first steps toward ideological self-reeducation. But my reeducation proceeded chiefly in the course of prolonged class struggle."¹

We can take Mao Tse-tung at his word: he had hardly ever studied the works of Marx seriously. However, this is not the point. The point is that from the outset Mao had ignored

¹ Mao Tse-tung. *On the Question of Correctly Resolving Contradictions Within the People*, Moscow, 1957, p. 26 (in Russ.).

many cardinal theoretical and political conclusions of Marxism. For example, he has never really understood what role the working class should play in revolution. He has never understood the importance of practising democracy within the party and the country as a whole both during the period of the revolution and in the period of building socialism. He has never understood Marx's fundamental idea that there exist objective economic laws in conformity with which economic and social tasks can be successfully carried out.

Gradually Mao Tse-tung began to foster his own home-made views and also "ideas" borrowed from Trotskyism, anarchism and other sources and substitute them for the Marxist-Leninist traditions in the Communist Party of China.

If we are to speak about the relation of Maoism to Marxism-Leninism in general, it can to a certain degree be likened to the relation of Bakuninism to Marxism in the 19th century and of Trotskyism to Leninism in the 20th century. And just as Trotskyism for a long time operated within the bounds of Social Democracy, Maoism, until recently at least, operated within the bounds of the world communist movement.

The most zealous henchmen of Mao, such as Chen Po-ta, assert that Mao has "Sinicized" Marxism. Incidentally, the concept of "Sinicization" is fully in line with the historical tradition of China which has always tried to refashion in her own way any theories introduced from the outside.

What is meant by "Sinicization" of Marxism? Essentially, this is not a matter of creatively applying the Marxist-Leninist theory to Chine-

se reality but of altering the basic principles of scientific communism.

In one of his early articles Mao Tse-tung wrote: "We must absorb whatever we today find useful . . . However, we must treat these foreign materials as we do our food, which should be chewed in the mouth, submitted to the working of the stomach and intestines, mixed with saliva, gastric juice and intestinal secretions, and then separated into essence to be absorbed and waste matter to be discarded — only thus can food benefit our body; we should never swallow anything raw or absorb it uncritically."¹

Let us skip the physiological comparisons, and consider what Mao has borrowed from Marxism and what he has rejected.

Mao is least of all interested in the theoretical basis of Marxism — dialectical materialism. We will not find in his writings or utterances the slightest attempt to investigate or even to discuss in a popular manner problems of the philosophy of the natural science, the theory of knowledge, logic, etc., or the theoretical principles of Marxist political economy. Mao has never set himself the task of analyzing, on the basis of facts and figures, contemporary capitalism or the development of capitalism in China herself. Economics and economic analysis have always been terra incognita for Mao and the Maoists. They did not even try to relate the theory of the class struggle and revolution to the economic laws of social development. Contempt for genuine theory, i.e. for a profound knowledge of

¹ Mao Tse-tung. *Selected Works*, London, 1954, Vol. 3, p. 154.

reality, has inevitably led the leaders of the CPC to cultivate extremely simplified, schematic and vulgarized notions about the problems of the modern world.

As regards the subject of historical materialism, we find in the works of Mao Tse-tung, as a rule, the same favourite topics: the question of the role of practice as the criterion of truth, the question of contradictions in social life, and some other questions, which are interpreted in an extremely one-sided and vulgar way.

Mao's approach to the theory of building socialism in China has always been tentative; it is not based on an analysis of the economic structure of Chinese society. The writings of Mao give no indication that he was sufficiently aware of the existence of objective laws governing the transition from capitalism to socialism. Instead he has always placed his hopes on voluntaristic, coercive, administrative methods of remaking society. This was also reflected in Mao's description of the ideals of socialism which he bases not on the needs of highly developed social production, or on the class interests of the most advanced social force — the proletariat, but on a mixture of the most diverse, at times contradictory, concepts.

Of course, some of the things Mao said in his works are correct. When he was not posing as the "leading theoretician" in the liberation movement, he readily borrowed ideas and even took long passages from the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin. Nevertheless, all his writings, including the earliest, show that he has never fully accepted or understood Marxism; in recent

years he has openly departed from Marxist-Leninist theory.

At the time when Mao's views were shaped various anarchist theories enjoyed wide currency in China. They exerted a considerable influence on Mao, as can be seen from his earlier and present works. The Maoists have also continually turned to Trotskyism from which they draw anti-Leninist ideas in their struggle against the CPSU and other communist parties. When one comes upon such expressions as "victory over imperialism through the development of a civil war on a world scale," "leaps," "militarization of labour" during the transition to socialism, the "bourgeois degeneration of the USSR," and the like, it is not difficult to recognize that here is Trotskyism, straight and undisguised.

A comparison of many of the statements made by Mao Tse-tung with the ideas and views held by the Socialist-Revolutionaries offers much food for thought as to the petty-bourgeois roots of Maoism. One recalls, for example, the theory of "heroes and the mob" or the theory of the leading role of the peasantry in the people's cultural development and in the revolutionary movement, which are among the main ideas held by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, or their naive statements about capitalism, and their lack of understanding of the role of the proletariat as the decisive revolutionary force. Of course, in this, as in other similar cases, it is not a question of direct borrowing. The point is that in its social nature Maoism is close to certain petty-bourgeois trends which have operated in the liberation movement during different periods of its development.

One, too, finds statements by Mao which greatly resemble the sayings of Chinese thinkers of the past (for example, in discussing contradictions he refers to the succession of day and night, winter and summer, light and shadow, and similar naive examples).

Also worth noting is Mao's constant striving to clothe ideas in the traditional form of aphorism: "Five is good and three is bad," "three years of struggle, ten thousand years of happiness," and so on. A mystical attitude towards numbers has long existed in China. And Mao utilizes this as a method of setting forth his views and slogans.

Compounded of various ideas and notions which have originated in China and in the liberation movement in other countries, Maoism can certainly lay no claim to being consistent and comprehensive. In fact, in reading Mao Tse-tung we constantly run against glaring contradictions, discrepancies and lack of logic.

DIALECTICS AND METAPHYSICS

Mao regards as his special theoretical accomplishment the elaboration and even the development of the Marxist teaching on contradictions as the source of movement in nature and society. Mao's best known work on this subject, "On the Question of Correctly Resolving Contradictions Within the People," has been discussed more than once in Soviet publications. Let us consider the direction which Mao's views have taken in the 1960s.

As an example we may take his statements on philosophical questions which he made on

the eve of and during the "cultural revolution," and which most clearly express his current positions.

It is generally known with what persistence, even to the point of being tedious, Mao returns to the thesis of contradictions in examining any problems — economic, political, international — and the most insignificant practical questions. In general, there would be nothing wrong with it: after all, the teaching on the unity and struggle of opposites, to use Lenin's expression, is the core of dialectics. The only trouble lies in the way Mao interprets this philosophical category.

"The Marxist teaching on the unity of opposites," Mao says, "became very widespread in our country in 1953." And he goes on to cite Chinese experience, Confucius and other ancient Chinese thinkers, and, finally, his own works.

There are, however, different kinds of dialectics. The contradictory character of phenomena in nature and society had been noted by ancient thinkers, including those of China. During the Renaissance, and especially in the period of the bourgeois revolution, progressive schools of thought not only revived the idea of the struggle of opposite principles in nature and society, but also extended this idea to the sphere of social relations, noting the existence of class struggle as an inevitable concomitant and a motive force of social development. Hegelian dialectics, while being based on the achievements of philosophy in the past, signified a big step forward toward the creation of a harmonious concept of the laws of movement in the world. Marxist dialectics represents not only the highest stage in phi-

losophy, but also a fundamentally new teaching which combines in one system of knowledge all the laws of dialectical development on the firm basis of materialism. Thus, in examining Maoism we need to answer the question of what dialectics lies behind its endless reiteration of the thesis about the struggle of opposites as the basic law of social life.

The first thing one notices in reading the above-mentioned work on contradictions by Mao is a drastic narrowing of the field of materialist dialectics and the laws of the Marxist theory of knowledge. Mao actually pays attention to only one thing: opposites. In his works we hardly find any serious analysis of or even reference to the idea of development, determinism, negation of the negation, the theory of evolution, etc. Such a narrowing of materialist dialectics, its reduction to a single law, cannot but lead to a simplistic notion of the world, and vulgarization in theory. But this is not all. The very interpretation offered by Mao of the law of the unity and struggle of opposites betrays a lack of understanding of the Marxist interpretation of this law.

In the work mentioned above Mao writes: "The Concise Philosophical Dictionary"¹ is specially directed against me. It says that to assert that life passes into death is metaphysics, and that to assert that war and peace reciprocally pass one into another is to make a mistake.

¹ Reference is made here to *The Concise Philosophical Dictionary*, edited by M. Rozental and P. Yudin, 4th edition, Moscow, State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1957, in Russian. In 1958 it was translated into Chinese and published in the PRC.

But who is right, after all? The living always emerges from the dead. Son turns into father, father turns into son, woman turns into man, man turns into woman. Direct transformation is impossible. But is not the birth of boys and girls as a result of marriage an example of a transformation? Mutual transformations of oppressors and oppressed make up the relations between the bourgeoisie and the landlords, on the one hand, and the workers and peasants, on the other."

Such statements concerning dialectics, which are typical of Mao, and their primitive nature hardly merit comment. But observe how consistently Marxism is replaced by views alien to it. Marxism speaks of the struggle and unity of opposites. Mao, however, lays stress on the mutual transformation of one opposite into another as a law of development. But after all death is not transformed into life, and life is not transformed into death. These are different qualitative conditions. A man is not transformed into a woman as a result of his wife giving birth to a daughter. He remains a man, although he serves as a source for the appearance of a new life.

The whole thing becomes even more serious when these naive arguments about the transformation of opposite elements are extended to social life. Mao writes about the transformation of the formerly oppressed into oppressors. This idea underlies his interpretation of social revolutions and the dictatorship of the masses. But does the meaning of social revolution lie in this? The proletariat does not at all strive to change places with the bourgeoisie and the landlords

and to become an oppressor. Its aim is to abolish all oppression and exploitation. When an aim such as Mao speaks of is put forward, namely, the aim of transforming the proletariat and the peasantry into oppressors, the structure of power is deformed and the political regime degenerates, which is what we see in present-day China.

"War passes into peace and peace passes into war," Mao says. "Peace is the reverse side of war; when no hostilities are conducted, this is peace . . . War is a specific form of politics. It is a continuation of politics: politics is also a kind of war." It follows that no changes in the social life of a people can in any way change the nature of this law. The appearance of socialist countries, according to this logic, introduces nothing new in international relations: here, too, there can be war as a form of transformation of peace into its opposite. The world socialist system, regardless of how strong it may be, is likewise incapable of exerting a decisive influence on the system of international relations where, as before, there are two possibilities, or, if one is to use Mao's terms, two inevitabilities — peace and war.

No matter how many times one repeats the words "transformation of opposites" one will not become a dialectician.

"All things have a beginning and an end. There are only two infinities: time and space," Mao says. "Infinity is formed from what has an end. All things without exception gradually develop, gradually change." But actually the situation is quite different. Infinity is a qualitatively distinct phenomenon, which is not formed

from finite phenomena. It has neither a beginning nor an end; this is difficult to grasp, for the human mind is limited in time.

Thus Mao replaces the thesis about the struggle of opposites by the assertion that the transformation of one opposite into another is inevitable. And in so doing he misinterprets the very concept of opposites; he interprets it metaphysically, absolutely, as complete mutual negation, as "yes" and "no." But, according to Marx, what is absolute is the very existence of contradictions and not the essence of contradictory substances. There are qualitative distinctions in the character of contradictions themselves both in nature and society. Water and ice are opposites, while they have the same composition of elements. Water and fire are also opposites, but they have a different composition of elements. That is why the mutual transformation of water and ice is possible, while the transformation of water into fire is impossible (we offer such elementary examples, just as Mao does, to make clear how wrong and primitive are the basic principles of his world outlook).

The qualitative dissimilarity of contradictions in social life is evident. Contradictions between the oppressed and the oppressors is one thing, and contradictions among the oppressors and among the oppressed is something else again. The history of social life offers the widest spectrum of shades of sources of social contradictions and ways of resolving them. But Mao fails to see this. For him contradictions between socialism and capitalism and between socialism and communism are phenomena of the same order subject to the same laws, i.e. the mutual

transformation of one into the other on the basis of the same laws of struggle in the same forms, and so on.

"In the Soviet Union nothing is said about contradictions between the leaders and the led. If there is no struggle of opposites, there is no world, no development, no life, there is nothing. Constant talk about cohesion and only about cohesion is like a pond with stagnant water. This is complete indifference. It is necessary to smash the basis of the old cohesion, to pass through struggle and form a cohesion on a new basis. Which is better — a pond with stagnant water, or the endless turbulent stream of the river Yangtze? And everything is like that: the parties, the classes, the peoples. Cohesion — struggle — cohesion."

The turbulent stream of the Yangtze undoubtedly presents an impressive spectacle. But along with turbulent mountain rivers there are rivers which flow through plains, which are calmer. Alongside rivers there are seas and lakes with even calmer waters. This is an objective phenomenon characterized by different properties. And should one try to make the Pacific Ocean flow as turbulently as the river Yangtze? It is necessary to see the qualitative difference of opposite phenomena in nature and society and to consider this as one considers a fact.

"Cohesion — struggle — cohesion" has become a favourite slogan with the Maoists in political practice in recent years. Connected with it are all the cataclysms of the "cultural revolution" within China and the attempts to split the world communist movement in the international arena. All this is pictured as an inevitability stemming

from the very laws of the existence and functioning of society and its social institutions. But here is a simple question: struggle against whom and for what aim? Cohesion with whom and on what basis? Mao's abstract scheme is incapable of giving a coherent answer to these questions. The references to the inevitability of the transformation of one opposite into another cannot be taken seriously by anyone.

It goes without saying that within the bounds of any, even the strongest unity there are elements of non-cohesion, including opposite principles and trends. But why must this lead to a split and, through the split, to a new kind of cohesion? There are other forms of resolving opposites and achieving unity, which are not based on abstract theorizing but are worked out in the course of real struggle of the communist movement to consolidate its unity and eliminate differences and thus to resolve opposites of the highest order — between the working class and the bourgeoisie, socialism and capitalism, the world socialist system and international imperialism. In other words, there are different contradictions, and not to see this difference is to paint the world in all its diversity in two colours — black and white.

Mao draws no distinction between the concept of opposite and the concept of contradiction. But not every contradiction signifies an opposite, an antithesis, an antagonism. The difference between sexes of which Mao often speaks, by no means implies that men and women are always in a state of antagonism and bitter struggle. Contradictions between social groups within the working class basically differ from the antithe-

sis between the working class and the bourgeoisie. Contradictions between the leaders and the led in conditions of socialism are not the equivalent to relations between the representatives of the political elite and the masses in conditions of capitalism. The antithesis between two types of property — private capitalist and socialist — is not equivalent to contradictions between two types of socialist property — that of the entire people and cooperative-collective farm property. Many more examples of this kind can be cited. Mao's identification of contradictions with opposites leads to wrong conclusions not only in theory but also in political practice.

DIALECTICS AND POLITICS

This confusion of opposites and contradictions is also seen in Mao's analysis of the categories of social life. "As regards the social system," Mao writes, "at the stage of socialism there exist simultaneously two forms of property, which is also a unity of opposites. Collective property contains elements of socialist property of the entire people. Its basis is collective property, but it also contains elements of communist property of the entire people." Actually, however, cooperative-collective farm property increasingly draws closer to property of the entire people; both are of a socialist nature and for all their distinctions are not opposites.

"The world, especially class society," Mao continues his reasoning, "is filled with contradictions. Some say that in socialist society it is possible to 'find' contradictions. I think that this

approach is wrong. The point is not that it is possible to find or not to find a contradiction, but that society is filled with contradictions . . . Look, even every atom is filled with contradictions which are in unity. There is the unity of opposites between the atomic nucleus and the electrons. And within the atomic nucleus there is the unity of opposites between protons and neutrons. Among protons, in turn, there are protons and anti-protons, among neutrons, there are neutrons and anti-neutrons. In short, unity of opposites exists everywhere."

Let us leave aside Mao's deliberations about the atomic nucleus. This is not what is important here. What should be noted is that we have here an example of confusing contradictions and opposites. In discussing class society Mao utilizes the concept of contradictions, but in speaking about socialist society he constantly uses the term opposites, which, to say the least, is illogical even from the standpoint of his own views.

Mao is especially far removed from Marxism when he discusses the concept of unity which is an essential element of the law of the unity and struggle of opposites. In general he speaks of unity very rarely, usually in passing, and with great reluctance. But opposites cannot exist outside of unity because then the meaning of this category itself — interdependence, interaction and interpenetration — is lost. The struggle of opposites is possible only within the bounds of a certain unity. Outside these bounds there are no opposites; there are simply phenomena unconnected with each other. There are opposites only where there is a connection,

interaction, interpenetration. Mao, following the logic of the transformation of one opposite into another, ignores the concept of unity between them. He merely remarks that unity is temporary and transitory and, having thus disposed of this category, immediately proceeds to his favourite subject of contradictions.

In speaking of capitalist society, Mao does not even try to form a notion of the nature of the unity of the opposite principles inherent in this society. We will find no statements on this score in his works, as though such a problem does not exist at all. Such a problem, however, does exist, and not only in theory but also in the political practice of the communist and workers' parties in capitalist countries. Without answering the question of what are the characteristics of the unity of social opposites under capitalism, what is the mechanism which binds this unity, and what are the "binders" themselves, it is impossible to elaborate the tactics of shattering this unity and exploding it from within. Communist philosophers who ponder over these problems invariably think of such social institutions and categories as the state, parties, culture, ethics, law, economic interests, national interests, ethnic community and many others. The very nature of society's economic structure is studied precisely from the standpoint of the unity of the opposite principles.

Mao displays similar "nihilism" with respect to socialism and the international communist movement. In fact, here, too, he ignores the concept of unity or interprets it in a relativistic spirit. This, for example, is what he writes concerning the applicability of the Marxist-

Leninist theory to conditions in China: "Combination of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution is materialism. The former and the latter represent a unity of opposites, i.e. dialectics. Why is it that sometimes what is alien is blindly copied? This happens because dialectics is not understood. The Soviet Union has its own, Soviet methods; Soviet experience is one side, the practice of China is another side. Here is a unity of opposites. As for Soviet experience, it is necessary to take from it what is good, positive, and follow it, and not to follow what is unsuccessful and negative in it. A narrow approach to Soviet experience, without considering Chinese practice — this is not selection of the positive or following the positive."

Here again is nothing else but a complete confusion of concepts. First, Marxism-Leninism is not equivalent to Soviet experience, but is made up of the experience of the USSR and other socialist countries, the entire international working class and communist movement. Secondly, what grounds are there for considering Soviet experience and Chinese experience a unity of opposites? In the first stage of the Chinese revolution and socialist construction the Chinese relied on the example of the transformations carried out in the Soviet Union, though they did not copy it blindly. It was only subsequently, under the influence of Maoism, that the Chinese and the Soviet experience began to be opposed to each other. Thirdly, and what is most important, the combining of a general theoretical truth with concrete conditions in no

way implies a unity of opposite elements. The general does not stand opposed to the particular but is manifested in it, just as a tree does not stand opposed to a forest, but is many times repeated in it, and in various forms.

From these statements by Mao we see how he came to depart from the general truth of Marxism-Leninism and to counterpose the experience of China to the experience of the USSR and other socialist countries, which was clearly manifested in the course of the "cultural revolution" and after it. Thus, the dialectical "play of the mind," accompanied by a concrete political scheme, actually distorts the Marxist concept of the unity and struggle of opposites. "Dialectics," Mao writes, "is the examination of questions in the unity of opposites. That is why such an examination is comprehensive. Life and death, war and peace are opposites, contradictions. There exists between them an internal connection. That is why at times the given opposites can also become a unity."

Thus for Mao unity can only be of a temporary nature; it is no more than a moment in the state of the opposites. But there can be no interrelations between opposites outside the framework of a definite unity, a structure where opposite principles exist and clash.

The entire pragmatism and narrowness of Maoist "dialectics" are most vividly revealed when Mao discusses the forms and methods of overcoming opposites, the ways of transition from one qualitative state to another. We shall examine three of his theses: the creation of opposites, wavelike development and leaps.

First, about the creation of opposites. According to Mao, there are two methods of creating opposites. "In one instance the opposite exists in society from the very beginning; for example, 'Rightists' have always existed. Whether to give this opposite freedom or not is a question of policy. We resolutely give it freedom, allow the broad voicing of opinions, provide it with a way out so that we can picture it as the opposite side and thus rouse the working people to join issue with it, to fight and resist it for the purpose of eliminating it."

This pronouncement based on a high-sounding postulate concerning the method of creating opposites sounds very much like an ordinary political provocation. This is a case of artificially creating a problem or complicating existing problems not with the object of solving them but merely to drive them inward. A graphic example of such a creation of opposites was the struggle against the "Rightists" in 1957. It is absolutely clear now that the slogan "Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a thousand schools of thought contend" was advanced, according to Mao's design, in order to provoke statements not only by hostile but also critically-minded intellectuals and subsequently strike a blow at this stratum and nip the critical spirit in the bud. Only in an atmosphere of moral terror and ostracism had it been possible to proclaim the line of "leaps" in the economy, which did not withstand elementary economic analysis from the standpoint of conformity between real possibilities and the outlined plans.

Let us cite one more pronouncement of the same type. "We are optimists, we are not af-

raid of a split. A split is a natural phenomenon. The splits engineered by Chen Tu-hsiu, Lo Chang-lung, Chang Kuo-tao and Kao Kang were of help to us. The Wang Ming trend, which appeared twice, and the Left-deviationist trends which appeared three times in the course of the civil war educated our Party. All these numerous opposites had a positive side. Certainly there is no need artificially to create Chen-Tu-hsius and Kao Kangs. They can appear only in a certain climate. And there is nothing terrible in that. They have to be defeated."

Such a policy also lay behind the "cultural revolution" which split the Communist Party of China from top to bottom. It is true that Mao achieved certain political aims which he had set — to reinforce the regime of personal power, and the dominant position of Maoism in the Party and the country, to do away with his political enemies and to create and maintain an atmosphere of nationalism in China. But did the Party and the Chinese people, did the cause of socialism, gain anything as a result? That is the question. The policy of artificially creating contradictions proved disastrous from the point of view of the interests of Chinese society.

The thesis about the creation of contradictions played a most baneful role also in the attempts of the Maoists to split the world communist movement. We may recall how the Chinese leaders constantly and artificially piled up contradictions, and fanned disputes, at first on comparatively minor matters, and then on ever more important issues, issues of principle, and, lastly, on fundamental questions of strategy and tactics of the communist movement. Many

contradictions were actually created artificially. The interests of the unity of the world communist movement were sacrificed to the claims of the Chinese leadership to being in the vanguard, to the claims of Mao Tse-tung himself to the role of the leading theoretician of Marxism-Leninism in our epoch.

No less significant is the Maoist thesis about the wavelike movement, as a form of eliminating contradictions. This thesis is Mao's substitute for the Marxist theory of evolution which Mao completely rejects. To all appearance, evolution as such seems to him to be not a Marxist theory, but a bourgeois, liberal, opportunist theory. While using the word "revolution" both in place and out of place, tossing it about like a ping-pong ball, Mao is inclined in some cases, particularly where it concerns the development of Chinese economy, to resort to such a substitute as "wavelike movement." "One wave has hardly receded," he declares, "when another wave arises. This is a unity of opposites — swift and slow. Wavelike movement forward in conditions of the general line, 'exerting all efforts and striving forward to build socialism according to the principle: bigger, faster, better, and more economically' — this is a unity of opposites, namely the unity of relaxation and tension, the unity of opposites — work and leisure. If there is only strain and work, this will be one-sided. How is it possible only to strain and strain at work and not to rest at all! In any undertaking relaxation must be alternated with tension . . . Intensive work and a respite are a unity of opposites."

All this verbiage would be just a bad dream,

if it had not been projected on the economic and social practice of China. If in the last decade the Chinese people have been given a respite it was only in order to plunge them later and once again in a headlong race which is not based on either good organization or scientifically elaborated plans, or incentives or other forms of stimulation. Hardly had the wave of economic leaps receded when a new wave came in its wake — "communization." Hardly had some order been introduced after the failure of "communization" when the country was engulfed by the wave of the "cultural revolution." The Chinese people are now having a brief breathing spell after that wave which disorganized many sectors of the economy, claimed the lives and freedom of hundreds of thousands of people and warped the country's political structure and social consciousness.

What will the next wave be like? The decisions of the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of China which spoke of "preparation for the event of war and famine" and a "new leap" show that the Chinese people will not be allowed to rest, that they will again be spurred on by another campaign and compelled to leap ever more rashly and heedlessly, not knowing where or why.

Closely connected with this is the Maoist interpretation of the theory of permanent revolution. "Co-operatives must develop in a wave-like way," Mao declared solemnly, "so that before one wave recedes, another wave should rise to take its place and thus, wave after wave, we have to move forward. A recession between two waves, a valley between two mountains. In

steering it is necessary to use the helm, to adapt to the changing circumstances. In an unfavourable situation it is necessary 'to apply the brakes' immediately. At a definite moment it is necessary to restrain the imagination of the people, if it runs away too far. Some ask: Are doubts necessary, are rules and restrictions necessary? Of course they are necessary. Both rules and restrictions are necessary; doubts, too, are necessary. Even Chu Pa-chieh¹ had three rules and five bans. Interruptions, stops, braking and the closing of sluices — all this is necessary. The method is as follows: when people begin to turn up their noses, it's time to set a new task before them. For example, now when we assess the quality of work, it is necessary that people should have no time to become conceited." The decisions of the Ninth CPC Congress directly contain references to the theory of the permanent revolution both within Chinese society and in the international arena.

Judging by such statements, Mao is unaware of the various methods and forms of revolutionary transformation of society at different historical stages and in different social conditions. Because of his petty-bourgeois nature he gravitates towards military-administrative decisions. That is why for him the overthrow of Kuomintang power is a revolution; the land reform is a revolution; changes in ideology and culture are a revolution; the split of the communist movement is a revolution, and the struggle against the CPSU and the Soviet state is a revolution. In other words, any political

¹ The pig Chu Pa-chieh, a character in the 16th century novel *Journey to the West* by Wu Cheng-en.

line is seen by him or at least interpreted by him from the angle of the deepening permanent revolution. Actually all this has nothing to do with the achievement of definite revolutionary tasks and aims, but concerns the forms and methods of implementing any political tenets. And the forms and methods of the Maoists are of a military-bureaucratic nature presented in a "revolutionary" guise: a rebellious movement of the masses, or demonstrations, or mass repressions, or military incidents on the frontiers, or noisy campaigns in the press, or radicalist talk, and so on.

The culmination of Mao's conception of contradictions is his interpretation of the "leap" in social development. Here Mao shows his capacity for fantasizing. He writes: "The leap is the most basic law of the Universe. The birth of a man is a leap, the death of a man is also a leap. If Chiang Kai-shek dies, all of us shall applaud, if Dulles dies we also shall shed no tears. But the perishing of the new, of new phenomena (for example, the defeat of the 1905 Russian revolution, the loss by us of the revolutionary bases in the south of the country) — this is always bad. Of course, it is bad, say, when hail and storm destroy the shoots of a new crop; this entails difficulties connected with additional sowing. We Communists proceed from the premise that things change. The so-called leap in no way resembles what was before. To overtake Britain in seven years and then in another eight years to overtake America, that is to overtake America in 15 years — this is a leap-like change."

As we can see from this and other statements

by Mao, the Maoist economic theory essentially consists in a feverish search of ways, forms and methods which would make it possible in the shortest historical period of time, utilizing any means, to dash forward, to put an end to the country's economic backwardness, and thus create the economic basis for Peking's hegemonic aspirations. We must be realistic and scientifically objective, and admit that this represented, and represents now, the cardinal aim of the Maoist's economic theory, if we are to understand all the sudden and drastic changes in the economic policy of the Chinese leadership with its rushing from one extreme to another, with the swift changes in principles and slogans of management, and with its unscrupulousness in the use of means and methods such as stepping up the exploitation of the working masses, "communization" and "militarization" of labour, and rash and irresponsible experimenting. The striving of the Chinese people to overcome economic backwardness in a brief historical period of time can only be met with the deepest understanding and sympathy. We also cannot fail to understand the necessary exertion of all its forces by a people that has fully resolved to cover within several decades a distance which it took other peoples several centuries to traverse. But sober philosophical and political thinking is needed to steer this enthusiasm into strictly planned channels, so that it should yield the maximum economic and social effect. In the case of Mao, however, we see something opposite. His idea of a leap in the economy means exploiting this enthusiasm in a parasitic way, which is far removed from a serious analysis of

economic problems.

The philosophical category of a leap—to understand it one must study the qualitative state on the basis of quite definite quantitative accumulations—is converted by Mao into a Leftist thesis of skipping over historically necessary stages. Such a policy renders futile the people's enthusiasm and revolutionary fervour. The sacrifices made by the people have not produced any results; they have not brought China a step closer to the present level of the industrially-developed countries.

Such a theory could only be based on sentiments of maximalism, petty-bourgeois hysteria and despair. It is not by chance that Mao wrote the following: "Lenin often said that a country has a choice—to win or to perish. Lenin did not conceal such a possibility. The People's Republic must not deny such a possibility. We have no atomic bomb; if the enemy captures Peking, Shanghai, Wuhan, we shall wage guerilla warfare, we shall retreat 10, 20 years, return to the Yen'an period. That is why we must actively prepare, strive to obtain in three-four years several tens of millions of tons of steel, to create an industrial base so as to be stronger than we are now."

But Lenin's statement was made at a time when the situation of the revolution and the Soviet Republic was most desperate. As for Mao's words, they were written in a period of normal, calm development in China, when the people's power consolidated in the country and when China had the possibility of relying on the political and economic support of the USSR and other socialist countries. Whence such hysteria

then? Whence this striving to solve in the course of a lifetime all the problems that have accumulated in China through centuries? Most probably this is due to the worst kind of messianic aspirations of an authoritarian regime which is given to gamble with the destiny of millions of people.

While orienting himself to leaps in social development, Mao at the same time constantly criticizes the economic and social development of the USSR, asserting that it is one-sided. "The main thing," Mao says, "is that they [the USSR] walked 'on one foot.'" This, in his opinion, was seen in the neglect of light industry and agriculture, in reliance on planning only to the detriment of the development of commodity production, and in social relations in the emphasis on "technology and technical personnel," in a "wrong combination of the immediate interests of the people with their long-term interests," in denying the importance of politics and in ignoring the interests of the masses. All this, according to Mao, means to "walk on one foot." Mao tries to counter this with a comprehensive dialectical approach and with the principle of an all-round development of the national economy.

At first glance, such a position may seem convincing. It appears to be based on a comprehensive approach to guiding the national economy and to call for consideration of all aspects of the economic process — all sectors of the economy without exception, the growth of the productive forces, the development of the relations of production and satisfaction of the requirements of the state, the masses, every collective, the individual, and so on.

But actually all this conceals a complete lack

of understanding of the real problems which arise in the course of socialist construction, problems which can be studied on the basis, not of a "comprehensive" ("all-round") approach, but of an analysis of the economy as a system of interaction both within itself and with the external environment, with the policy and with the social aims of society, with the development of class relations, foreign policy, and so on. Such a systemic approach enables one to find answers to questions of economic construction in every given historical period, in every given concrete situation, in all their interconnections. Such an approach permits a serious analysis of historical achievements and also an analysis of difficulties and mistakes in the course of economic construction in one or another socialist country.

Harmonious economic development is undoubtedly a desirable thing. But for an economically backward country which has set itself the task of eliminating its backwardness in a historically brief period of time and attaining the level of development of an advanced nation, a country which is, moreover, compelled to devote special efforts to reinforce its defence industry because of the international situation — for such a country the choice is a difficult one: whether to channel its main resources and efforts into agriculture and light industry so as to accumulate resources and then build up the heavy and defence industries, or, on the contrary, into the heavy and defence industries, in order to accomplish definite political and social tasks and subsequently develop agriculture and light industry.

It must be noted that the process of deformation of the economy of China is due to Mao's policy. The policy of "leaps" and "communes" does not in the least conform to the principle of all-round, harmonious and proportionate development of the economy. On the contrary, it is a direct antithesis to this principle. It may be assumed that Mao's pronouncements (in the second half of 1959) in favour of a comprehensive approach to the development of the economy were actually an attempt to dissociate himself from the extremes of the policy of "leaps" and "communes" the adverse effects of which were already then fully clear and were criticized at plenary meetings of the CPC Central Committee.

A few more words are needed to complete our analysis of Mao's social philosophy. The harmful effect of Mao's distorted notion of Marxist dialectics is particularly notable in Mao's interpretation of the laws of development of socialist society and the process of its growth into communist society. "After the transitional period has come to an end," Mao says, "after the abolition of classes, if we speak only of the internal situation in our country, politics will pass completely to the sphere of relations within the people. The ideological struggle, the political struggle and the revolution will continue; moreover, they cannot but continue. The law of the unity of opposites, the law of quantitative and qualitative changes, the law of assertion and negation existed and exists eternally and everywhere. But the nature of the struggle and the revolution will differ from that in the past. This will not be a class struggle, but a struggle within the people between the advanced

and the backward elements, a struggle between the advanced and the backward in science and technology. The transition from socialism to communism is a struggle, a revolution. Entry into communism will be a struggle, a revolution. Entry into the communist epoch will necessarily pass through many stages of development. And the relations of transition from stage to stage will inevitably represent some kind of relations of transition of quantitative into qualitative changes. Different sudden changes, leaps are also a kind of revolution; they will take place through struggle."

The toying with "dialectical" words and the striving to prove at any price his favourite thesis about the inevitability of "leaps" played a bad joke on Mao as he tried to tackle the fundamental philosophical and socio-political problem of socialist countries — the ways of transition from socialism to communism. First of all, we see that Mao is not really saying anything in the above-quoted passage. What will happen, during the transition to communism, to the state, to commodity relations, to the two types of property, the classes and social strata, to the Party and other mass organizations, what policy should be followed now to facilitate this transition — apparently Mao has not even thought about such matters.

Nor does he understand the qualitative differences between the laws governing the stage of transition from capitalism to socialism and those governing the stage of transition from socialism to communism. It is correct to say that there will be many stages in the transition to communism — this was shown by Lenin and is

stated in documents of the CPSU and other communist parties. The conception of a developed socialist society, put forward at the 24th CPSU Congress, represents a profound theoretical and political answer to the question about stages in the transition from socialism to communism. But it is not true that the transition from one stage to another will be accompanied by leaps and so-called revolutions, as Mao asserts, and that these leaps will be of a sudden, spontaneous or arbitrary nature. Quite the contrary, socialism for the first time opens up the possibility not only of forecasting but also of planning economic and social changes that will take place without cataclysms, without breaks in the chain of the gradual ascendancy to ever more mature and higher forms of life. And the main thing Mao does not understand is that socialism is a prolonged stage of development of human society governed by new laws corresponding to the new type of production and social relations; that socialism has to exhaust its entire potential for progress and thereby ensure the conditions for the transition to a higher, communist stage, which is its direct continuation, and not its complete negation.

China is now faced with entirely different social tasks, which are those of the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, and in defining them one should take into account the specific conditions of the country. China would need to achieve a sharp increase in her productive forces and to gradually master modern science and technology, to attain a higher level of industrialization of agriculture so as to provide food for her rapidly increasing population and

raw materials for industry, to carry out radical changes in her educational and cultural policy, especially concerning management, and to accomplish many other complex and important tasks belonging to the transition period. Life itself has shown that Maoism, far from solving the pressing problems of development of the PRC, resists their solution and undermines the people's power as defined by the constitution of the PRC. It is here that the anti-Marxist essence of the theory and practice of Maoism is most strikingly manifested.

Rewriting History, Maoist Style

V. Nikiforov

Until the mid-1960s Chinese historiography, while showing traits of scholasticism, dogmatism and nationalism, in general carried on the age-old traditions of conscientious research and adhered to many progressive traditions that had developed under the impact of a country-wide revolutionary upsurge, of Marxist-Leninist ideas and Soviet historical science. In the 1950s there were published many works by Chinese historians including Fan Wen-lan, Lo Erh-kang, Chiang Po-tsan, Kuo Mo-jo, Hou Wai-lu, and Shang Yueh. For all their shortcomings, these works represented a notable achievement of Chinese historiography. Later, however, the Maoists asserted that the works of such historians as Wu Han, Teng To, Li Shu, and Chian Po-chian were responsible for the spread of views that were contrary to the "ideas" of Mao Tse-tung.

The Maoists, in an attempt to prove China's "special" role in today's world, are using historical science as a tool of disseminating nationalistic and social-chauvinistic ideas among the masses.

The question of dividing ancient history in periods has always held a great interest for Chinese scholars. Did China have a period of slavery? If so, when did it begin and when did it end? The subject has been raised once again by Kuo Mo-jo in his essay "Problems of Periodization of the Early History of China."

Discussions on the subject had gone on for some time and were particularly lively in 1956-57. At that time Kuo Mo-jo said that the borderline dividing the period of slavery and that of feudalism in China was somewhere from the 6th to the 4th century B.C. Today he reiterates this view, which presumably is semi-official.

Soviet historians long ago pointed out that though the problems of ancient history were open to discussion, Kuo Mo-jo's viewpoint was far from being convincing. The superceding of one social system by another invariably marks a revolutionary turning point in history. It is always accompanied by the destruction of the old superstructure and its replacement by a new one. As to China, between the 6th and 4th centuries B.C. she was moving toward the formation of a united centralized state. It was a period of a comparatively peaceful evolution of Chinese society.

Kuo Mo-jo also repeats his old arguments based on a single sentence in the "Chun Chiu" (Spring and Autumn Annals), which referred to the first taxes levied on one mou of land in the

15th year of the rule of Hsuan-kung (594 B.C.) in the state of Lu. "Though this sentence consists of only three words," says Kuo Mo-jo, "it has profound historical significance. It shows that a class of landowners had appeared on the scene and that this phenomenon was legally recognized for the first time. . . Thus, one can hardly call in question the fact that Chinese society was slave-owning and not feudal till the middle of the Chun Chiu period."

Such reasoning lays bare the shortcomings of Kuo Mo-jo's method. According to his logic, it would seem that if in one historical document concerning one part of China there is recorded the appearance of the land tax, this meant that relations of land dependence had become predominant in the social and economic life of China as a whole, and that the country had undergone a complete change, including its political, ideological and legal superstructures. But, as every Marxist knows, changes in the superstructure do not always and in full measure follow immediately changes in the basis. Such changes were also particularly slow in ancient times.

Though Kuo Mo-jo is now repeating basically the same arguments which he advanced in 1952, what is new about his essay of 1972 is that he is more eager than ever before in turning to the writings of Mao as to gospel truth.

"Three times," Kuo Mo-jo writes, "have I changed my views concerning the borderline between the slave-owning and feudal systems, dating it first to the 8th, then to the 3rd and finally to the 5th century B. C. What enabled me to change my views for the third time was

nothing else but the works of Chairman Mao. They gave me the clue; they taught me to use my brains and enabled me to cut the Gordian knot of ancient Chinese society. Chairman Mao says: 'The main contradiction of feudal society is that between the peasant class and the class of landowners.' I consciously followed the road charted by Chairman Mao, that is to say, I kept constantly in mind this principal contradiction of feudal society — that between the peasant class and the class of landowners, and especially, the second element of this contradiction — the class of landowners. If a class of landowners, in the strict sense of the term, is non-existent in a particular historical period, then the society of that period cannot be said to be feudal. That was how I found the right track."

Such "reasoning" speaks for itself. Of course there is no feudalism, when there is no class of landowners, but can such an obvious conclusion be regarded as a discovery? And one wonders how this "discovery" can help answer the question of when the class of landowners appeared in China and when it became the ruling class.

Here is another instance of Kuo Mo-jo's method of research. In his article "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party" Mao Tse-tung observed that the feudal system had existed in China beginning from the Chou and Ch'in dynasties. It follows from this that Mao Tse-tung believes (and so do many Chinese historians) that ancient Chinese society was feudal. However, he fails to say in which century the era of feudalism began. The phrase 'beginning from the Chou and Ch'in dynasties'

is so vague that it could refer to any period from the 11th to the 3rd centuries B.C. But since Kuo Mo-jo needs something to back up his contention that slavery was replaced by feudalism in China between the 6th and 4th centuries B.C., he cites the above-mentioned remark by Mao as decisive, indisputable proof of his thesis.

Such "method of proving" is characteristic of Chinese historiography today. For instance, the Shanghai Teachers College has put out a booklet called "The I Ho Tuan Movement," which deals with the popular uprising of 1898-1900.

The very choice of the subject is significant. For there is hardly an instance in China's history of a more spontaneous outburst of popular wrath against foreign oppression than the I Ho Tuan uprising, during which justified anger against imperialists often turned into blind hostility against everything foreign.

But there is more to it than that. The year 1900 was a tragic page in the history of Russian-Chinese relations. Under the instigation of military imperialist quarters, the tsarist regime at that time undertook foreign policy adventures and, ignoring the age-old traditions of good neighbourly relations between Russia and China, joined in the imperialist intervention aimed at suppressing the I Ho Tuan rebellion. The masterminds of the anti-Soviet campaigns in Peking have apparently decided to revive the memories of this event in an attempt to stir up nationalistic feelings.

The negative aspects of the I Ho Tuan Movement were also loudly praised during the "cultural revolution." Chi Pen-yu, an ultra-Leftist,

who in those years considered himself the leading scholar in the field of history, quoted Mao Tse-tung as saying that "a riot is always a just cause" and described the I Ho Tuan rebellion as "a great anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolutionary mass movement in China's modern history." Chi Pen-yu denounced the film "The Secret of the Ch'in Court" released in China at that time, in which the ignorance and mysticism of the I Ho Tuans were admitted. He called this slander reflecting "the bitter hatred of the class enemies for the peasants as the chief motive force of the Chinese revolution." The "cultural revolution" had ended and Chi Pen-yu had long been removed from the scene, but his interpretation of the I Ho Tuan rebellion has remained.

The unnamed authors of the booklet, quoting Mao Tse-tung on nearly every page, try hard to picture the I Ho Tuans as revolutionaries who fought not only against foreign invaders but also against feudalism in China. They play down the fact that the I Ho Tuans allied themselves with the reactionary feudal clique, and extol spontaneous rioting, which is a backward form of rebellion.

Soviet scholars regard the 1900 uprising in China as an outbreak of just and understandable indignation against imperialist oppression on the part of a largely ignorant and backward people. Their conclusion is based on what Lenin said about the I Ho Tuan uprising and about popular movements of the type of the "old Chinese riots." They also point to the weaknesses of the I Ho Tuan movement, manifested in the rebels' negative attitude toward progress which they identified with domination by the

"overseas devils," and in their monarchical ideas which ruled out an alliance with the progressive and revolutionary segment of Chinese society led by Sun Yat-sen. In those circumstances it was not surprising that a well-trained and well-equipped army of intervention, though comparatively small (about 40,000 men), quickly and brutally crushed the uprising, defeating the Chinese troops and the I Ho Tuan army of 100,000 men.

Peasant rebels have no chance if they are not led by a progressive class. The I Ho Tuan movement was a striking case in point. But the authors of the Chinese booklet, flying in the face of facts, extol this movement, regarding it as an ideal of "a great riot" which presumably proved that imperialism is nothing but a "paper tiger." To say so is really to turn history upside down.

Another anonymous booklet published recently in the People's Republic of China also deserves attention chiefly because it sets off Chen Yu-cheng against the most prominent and popular leader of the Tai Ping Rebellion, Li Hsiu-cheng. In this booklet Li is described as an apostate and a traitor. This view was first expressed by Chi Pen-yu who, in 1963, accused Li of betrayal. Actually, Li, while in prison, had tried to outwit his captors. He wrote a letter to the Ch'ing General Tseng Kuo-fan, who had captured him, offering his services. In his campaign to destroy the image of Li Hsiu-cheng, Chi Pen-yu was actually aiming his fire at Liu Shao-chi, who had led the underground Communist Party organizations and whom the Maoists later accused of allowing the Communists arrested by

the Kuomintang to make false statements about their break with the Party. What this amounts to is that the Maoists rewrite history to suit their purposes. The same is happening now. The assessments of historical events and personalities made during the "cultural revolution" are being reaffirmed.

In August, 1972, an article was published, dealing with the period of the Chinese revolution after World War II. It is devoted to the Mukden or Shenyang battle, the turning point in the People's Liberation War of 1945-49. There is no question that the battle was an important one and deserves study. For it was North East China or Manchuria, which was liberated by the Soviet Army from Japanese imperialism in 1945, that became the main stronghold of the Chinese revolution and received all-round support from the Soviet Union. And it was this support that helped Lin Piao's army to repulse the Kuomintang's attacks in 1946 and to launch in 1948 the crucial offensive that created an entirely new situation in North East and North China and that led to the complete victory of the Chinese revolution in the following year.

In the article mentioned above, the description of the Shenyang battle has all the usual shortcomings of Maoist historiography. It merely lists the military operations and situations. It completely ignores the significance of the revolutionary base in Manchuria and of Soviet help to China's revolutionary forces. And it says nothing about the men who played an active role in the events in North East China at that time. The entire victory is attributed to Mao Tse-tung who was never in the area. The article mentions "sco-

undrels of the Liu Shao-chi type" who presumably proposed a wrong strategic plan for an offensive on Changchun, which was rejected by Mao Tse-tung who then put forward his own plan of directing the main attack at Chinchow. The whole story is based on two telegrams signed by Mao, one dated September and the other October 1948, and is not backed up by any other documents. Evidently, the Maoists still regard contemporary history mainly as a battle-ground of propaganda against their opponents within the Chinese Communist Party, on whom they now try to put the blame for all mistakes ever committed by the leadership.

The problems discussed here concern Chinese history only. A fundamentally new feature of the present-day historical studies in China is that their emphasis is being shifted from Chinese to world history.

Before the People's Republic of China was proclaimed, the study and the teaching of world history in China were on a very low level. There were only a few scholars in this field, who were graduates of foreign colleges. It was only after 1949 that the training of researchers in history began and world history was included in the curricula of colleges and universities, though later the Maoists impeded the large-scale development of this new branch of historical science in China.

In April 1972, however, the magazine "Hung-chi" began to publish articles laying down guidelines for the study of the history of foreign countries. The author (or authors) took up the pen-name of Shih Chun, which literally means

a "historical army." The articles were: "On the Study of World History" (1972, No. 4), "Once Again on the Study of World History" (1972, No. 5), "On the Study of the History of Imperialism" (1972, No. 6) and "To Understand the History of the National Liberation Movement" (1972, No. 11).

Shih Chun begins by saying that it is a duty of "party members and functionaries, the broad mass of workers, peasants, and soldiers and the entire youth" to study world history. Citing Mao he asserts that the "presence or absence of a knowledge of history should be regarded as a condition for the possibility or impossibility of the victory of the proletariat's revolutionary party," that is, the Maoist party.

The main feature of these articles is that in them the Marxist-Leninist principle of a class-oriented analysis of history is replaced by a non-class, narrow-minded nationalistic approach to history. The emphasis throughout is on the history of national liberation movements and not on the class struggle, though the author admits that class struggle constitutes the main content of world history. It seems, however, that he mentions this only in order to cover up more completely one of the most salient features of the Maoist approach to social and political phenomena—the rejection of socio-economic analysis and class principles which are replaced by voluntaristic directives.

In past years, modern Chinese historiography also tended to substitute subjectivism for historical materialism. Soviet historians have observed on many occasions that a number of Chinese scholars influenced by Mao's views start from

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a purely political principle in describing comprador bourgeoisie in China in the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries. These scholars regard social groups supporting the revolution at various stages as national bourgeoisie while describing the groups opposing the revolution as compradors. Thus, they use the term "comprador," which has a definite socio-economic meaning, for their immediate political purposes. This leads to utter confusion. For instance, in his writings Mao Tse-tung regards the Right wing of Kuomintang as compradors, but describes its principal ideologist, Tai Chi-tao, as the ideologist of the national bourgeoisie. This unscrupulous political approach to history is carried still further in Shih Chun's articles.

According to Shih Chun, in studying world history one should proceed from the common destiny of China and the oppressed nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America. On these continents, says Shih Chun, brilliant ancient civilizations had flourished, and they had contributed much to mankind's progress till the end of the 15th century when they were attacked by Western colonialism and turned into colonies and semi-colonies. This is what brings together "China and the absolute majority of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America," forming what is known as the Third World. From this argument Shih Chun proceeds to formulate his idea of "classes," backing it up by this demagogic statement: "The people of our country, the oppressed nations and peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America are linked by blood ties and are class brothers." This shows that Shih Chun makes no distinction whatsoever between

workers and capitalists in the Asian, African and Latin American countries. He applies the term "class" to entire nations on the sole ground that the peoples of these three continents were oppressed. This argument may strike one as absurd at first, but the whole point is that such argument is necessary for explaining, from an idealistic standpoint, the change of socio-economic systems and the emergence of national liberation movements.

Indeed, it makes no difference to Shih Chun whether the question under consideration is one of self-defence of primitive communities fighting against colonialists with arrows and spears, or one of independence struggle of workers and peasants. He does not ask whether it is the bourgeoisie or the working class that lead the struggle or which system, socialist or capitalist, will be established in the liberated country. Everything is "explained" by an abstract, non-class formula: "Wherever there is oppression, there is also resistance to it."

Shih Chun hews to the same idealistic way of reasoning in the third article which deals with the subject of imperialism. Here he cites Lenin only in order to cover up his own interpretation of imperialism. Shih Chun identifies imperialism with colonialism. This is done deliberately. The trick of playing up colonialism serves one purpose only — to sell the notorious Maoist idea of "superpowers."

Discourses on "superpowers" are found in each of the four articles. The author expounds world history in such a way as to convey the impression that its main feature, at least in the 19th and 20th centuries, consists, on the one

hand, in the conflict between the two "super-powers" and, on the other, in the fight against them by the rest of the world. According to Shih Chun, the United States "had for a long time hardly taken any part in the struggle for domination between European powers" because the Americans entered the scramble for world supremacy only after World War II. And he asserts that "the entire modern history of Russia" has been marked by a fight for "world supremacy."

Shih Chun speaks of Russia's policy with particular hatred describing it as a "global strategy of aggression and expansion." In utter disregard of historical facts he claims that even during the reign of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich (according to the writer, modern history starts in 1640) Muscovy was engaged in a struggle for world domination.

Shih Chun goes to great lengths to picture Russia as China's age-old enemy. He asserts that Russia "seized a large territory belonging to China." And he sees no difference between tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union, asserting that the Soviet Union has inherited the imperialist traditions of tsarist Russia and has "fully restored capitalism." The purpose of this pack of lies is to picture the Soviet Union as an "imperialist power" trying to build a "new great colonial empire."

It is significant that none of the articles actually distinguishes the contemporary period in world history. Even the article devoted to the study of modern and contemporary history is no exception, though the terms "modern history" — "chintaishih", and "contemporary histo-

ry" — "hsintaishih" are clearly defined. Shih Chun describes the contemporary period as a mere stage in modern history. It should be noted that earlier, Chinese historians had agreed with their Soviet colleagues that contemporary history should be regarded as starting from 1917 and studied as a separate epoch. Thus, for instance, a prominent Chinese historian, the late Fan Wen-lan, who was the Director of the Institute of Modern History of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, admitted in 1959 that the title of his work, "Modern History of China," published in 1945, was incorrect. For the author had intended to cover not only modern but also contemporary history. Fan Wen-lan decided then to retain the term "modern history" only for the chapters dealing with events prior to 1917. He did this because, as he put it, there is "a clear demarcation line between modern and contemporary history" which is recognized by Marxists. But the year 1917 is no longer accepted by the Maoists as a landmark in world history. The fact is that acknowledgement of the historic importance of the Great October Socialist Revolution has become for the Maoists a sheer formality. Thus, Shih Chun merely mentions the 1917 Revolution in passing and lumps it together with the English, American and French bourgeois revolutions, the 1848 revolution, the Paris Commune and the 1949 revolution in China.

Shih Chun's articles about world history have much to do with China's history. While describing China as a socialist country, Shih Chun defines the socialist society in China in a most unusual way. According to Maoist dogmas, an-

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tagonistic classes and class struggle also exist in a socialist society, which goes through periodic riots of the type of the "cultural revolution." The Maoists actually reject the idea of socialism and of the socialist stage of development both in China and in the rest of the world, just as they did during the notorious great leap forward when Mao Tse-tung and his followers appealed to the people to advance straight to communism, by-passing socialism.

As a matter of fact, Shih Chun does not believe in socialism at all. Nor does he believe in the victory of the progressive forces at the present stage of historical development. He repeatedly says that "the revolutionary path is long and tortuous." Whether he is describing the replacement of slavery by feudalism or the transition from feudalism to capitalism, his thesis is that progress is painful and complicated. Peking's "Jenmin jihpao" echoes Shih Chun by saying that "history and the road of revolution are marked by twists and turns." The paper notes that "this is particularly true of the proletarian revolution whose aim is to put an end to capitalism and all systems of exploitation."

Significantly, Shih Chun lays increasing emphasis on his idea of the "zigzags of history" as he goes from one article to the next. He seems to think that this argument will help him whitewash the failures of the Chinese leaders' adventurist policy both at home and abroad and turn them into a general "law of history."

It is also clear that Mao Tse-tung and his followers are very much disappointed with the world revolutionary movement because it has rejected their claims to leadership. What is

more, it has described their line as splitting, adventurist and chauvinistic, spearheaded against the forces of peace, democracy and socialism and playing into the hands of the world reactionary forces. The Peking leaders are trying to conceal their disappointment by making bombastic statements about an "extremely favourable situation" and their inevitable victory, and by injecting a forced note of cheerfulness into their appeals for optimism.

At the same time, many speeches and articles by Chinese leaders, including the article we have discussed here, are permeated with a note of despondency and pessimism. "There are many obstacles, many difficulties on the way of the revolution," "Jenmin jihpao" complained on July 11, 1972.

World History in the Distorting Mirror of Maoism

E. Zhukov, V. Krivtsov, V. Fetov

The current situation in China points to a deep ideological and political crisis of Maoism and shows that the people are losing confidence in the present regime. The events of September 1971, when following the removal of the well-known party leader, Chen Po-ta, Defence Minister Lin Piao (Mao Tse-tung's official successor to the post of Chairman of the Communist Party of China) and several other top military leaders were removed from the political scene, revealed another split in Peking's ruling clique, this time a more serious one. To all appearance, the split which considerably weakened the Maoist ranks and greatly impaired their ideological and political positions, was caused by a dispute over the question of a further re-orientation of China's foreign policy towards the imperialist powers, towards capitalism.

The opponents of such re-orientation presumably had had some support from various social strata. This would seem to be the only explanation why the Maoists even today, more than a year after the above-mentioned events, continue cursing the "exposed scoundrels" in public and threatening with their fate all those who question, openly or covertly, the "wisdom and far-sightedness" of the "special course" pursued by the present leadership. The doubts which first made themselves felt after the collapse of the "big leap" in the economic sphere and later as a result of the "cultural revolution" have evidently increased. This is confirmed by the fact that apart from the intimidation campaign, which has snowballed, suggesting that there is an unceasing covert struggle inside the upper echelons of power and in other sections among the adherents of different trends, official Peking propaganda is searching for every possible means to bolster the people's shaken faith in Maoism. Being aware that under the circumstances directives alone will not do, it is trying to provide "theoretical argumentation" for its great-power, chauvinist, anti-socialist, anti-Soviet policy.

An example of such attempts is provided by the articles on world history by Shih Chun, published in the journal "Hungchi," organ of the CPC Central Committee. They constitute, in effect, a manifesto of chauvinism and Sinocentrism.

Shih Chun's articles are of a dogmatic nature and pursue a definite political purpose. Proceeding from the unscientific, great-power platform of Maoism, they set out to falsify the course of

historical development, blot out the principal results of human progress, distort, in particular, the historical revolutionary process, place world socialism on a level with imperialism, reduce all revolutionary movements to movements for national liberation and present China as the leader of the Third World, and to "prove" the inevitable triumph of Maoism throughout the world. The world historical process is made to fit into the preconceived schemes for the hegemonic claims of the Maoist leadership.

The author concocts historical "laws" in order to justify the great-power policy of Peking and the idea of its global hegemony, portraying them as the "natural product" of the entire course of world history.

The articles by Shih Chun "project," as it were, into the future the whole strategy by which the Maoists intend to guide themselves in their struggle for hegemony while pretending to follow the "laws of history." Actually it is a strategy of anti-Sovietism above all.

That is why in Shih Chun's scheme, which is founded on an arbitrary interpretation of the history of the national liberation and revolutionary movements, no space is given to the worldwide historical significance of the formation and development of the first socialist state — the Soviet Union, and of the world socialist system — the leading force of our time. Nor is the international working class regarded in this scheme as the bearer of revolutionary changes and historical progress. As a result, the alignment of class forces in the world arena is completely distorted. The author makes no mention either

of the general crisis of capitalism or of the difference between the two world systems. Instead of the clear-cut, main trend of world development which is determined by mankind's transition to socialism, he sees a world dominated by "chaos" and "great disturbances," among which he indiscriminately includes both "invasions by aliens" and "internecine wars and wars with other nations." The "chaos on earth," according to him, is "the expression of the aggravation of the basic contradictions in today's world," and with this traditional concept typical of feudal China the author explains away the diversity and complexity of socio-political processes.

The question arises: what, then, are the poles in today's world and what are the motive forces of historical development? If we disregard Shih Chun's verbiage, we find that he thinks in terms of nationalistic, racial and geopolitical, not class poles and forces. In the final analysis, Shih Chun measures them with the yardsticks usually employed by bourgeois methodology to calculate the balance of forces, and he makes a similar calculation with regard to the great-power designs of Peking.

In accordance with the geopolitical conception of Maoism, Shih Chun puts the "two super-powers" (the USSR and the USA) at one pole of the "world chaos," depicting both as the bearers of regressive tendencies and the exploitative system, as oppressors of the rest of the world. In placing the states with diametrically opposite social systems on the same level, the author tries to extend the world's justifiable mistrust of US imperialism to the Soviet Union, and to

weaken the attractive powers which communist construction in the Soviet Union has for the Chinese people, the developing nations and the peoples of the whole world.

When speaking of the Third World countries, Shih Chun says nothing about their socio-economic and political diversity. According to him, the Third World is the principal zone of "chaos" and at the same time an isolated community in that "chaos" which is not only disconnected from the leading revolutionary forces of our time, but even opposed to them.

Shih Chun asserts that the task of the Third World nations is not to take an active part in world-wide social changes, not to choose progressive paths of development, but to fight the Soviet Union so as to counter the "hegemony of the superpowers." He openly calls on the Third World countries to enter into such a fight. "The aggression and oppression by the two superpowers," he declares, "make the peoples of the world feel the necessity of a fresh awakening, and are a stimulus to the broadest possible alliance of the developing countries."

Juggling the unscientific concept of "the two superpowers," he tries to put across the idea that struggle of the Third World against the Soviet Union is natural and almost inevitable historically. In so doing he betrays the secret desire of Maoism — to push the young states onto the dangerous path of anti-Sovietism, for once they take this path, they are bound to become an easy prey to imperialism, or to seek the patronage of Peking. Understandably, such guidelines contradict the basic interests of the peoples in the developing countries. But the

Maoists are not disturbed by this: in their struggle for hegemony they hope to have the support of the anti-communist elements in the Third World.

Shih Chun's articles also deal with the "middle and small countries," which are treated as a single group and which, like the Third World countries, "must devote themselves to the struggle against the two superpowers." The stake on that group of countries, among which the Maoists include, with the exception of the USA, all the imperialist powers (in his notorious theory of "intermediate zones" Mao Tse-tung calls them simply capitalist), shows that Peking still hopes to form an anti-Soviet bloc out of countries of different social and political make-up and to use them to further its great-power policy.

Shih Chun writes: "The time when the world was dominated by the two superpowers will not come back" ("Hungchi," No. 4, 1972, p. 16). And also: "The actions of American imperialism and social-imperialism, which are the death convulsions of imperialism, have incited and continue to incite the peoples of the whole world and a large number of small and middle countries to wage a just and powerful struggle against the two hegemonic powers" ("Hungchi," No. 6, p. 39). And he makes it clear that Peking would assess the role of these countries in history by the extent to which they fight the "superpowers."

The idea behind these contentions is clear. What Shih Chun is saying is that as the time dominated by two forces that are opposed to each other — socialism and imperialism — "is

coming to an end or has "expired," a new force, namely, China, has emerged, which is bound to replace them, with Peking becoming the political centre of the world.

"Historical discoveries" of this kind are meant primarily for the Chinese people who are being told that they must be patient and continue to follow, in spite of everything, the course mapped out by Mao Tse-tung, and that the hour for the global hegemony of China will strike, for "history itself is for Mao Tse-tung."

According to Shih Chun China is the decisive force which "welcomes" the "chaos" taking place in the world as a "normal phenomenon of the great revolutionary epoch corresponding to the objective laws of historical development" ("Hungchi," No. 4, p. 17). Here it becomes clear that the author extols the "chaos," while discarding socio-political criteria for its appraisal, for the ulterior purpose of providing a "basis" for a number of Maoist postulates. First of all, he is attempting to furnish a "historical basis" for the Maoist conception of world development, according to which wars and world conflicts are the chief stimulus for the revolutionary process. This, in effect, is counting on international tension as a general condition for aggravating relations between the countries of the two world systems.

Implicit in the whole course of Shih Chun's argumentation is the idea that only China and Mao Tse-tung, on whose utterances the articles are based, are qualified to consider the historical prospects in the "chaos," to give it a "revolutionary" orientation and single out the "struggle against the superpowers," which Peking now

calls the "great tendency of the 1970s." The revolutionary process is identified with the struggle against the "superpowers," and from this point of view the revolutionary forces are appraised. Actually this is a programme aimed at mobilizing the Third World countries and other forces under the banner of Maoism's anti-Soviet strategy, which is passed off as the banner of revolution and "counteraction to the hegemony of the superpowers." In this programme, as a matter of fact, the Third World is regarded as a sphere for the hegemony of Maoism.

Shih Chun tries to mask the essence of his arguments by emphasizing China's connection with the Third World, asserting that China and the absolute majority of the states of Asia, Africa and Latin America belong to the Third World and act as "companions-in-arms" ("Hungchi," No. 4, p. 19).

The idea behind the call for "companionship-in-arms" is obvious, since the Maoists base their policy on anti-Sovietism and insist that irreconcilable contradictions exist between the Third World and the Soviet Union. Shih Chun is clearly trying to mislead the Third World nations as regards the true social content of contemporary world development, and to set the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America against their historical allies — world socialism and the international working class, and the peoples of the other continents as a whole.

Shih Chun presents the course of world history as "proof" of the Maoist thesis that Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute the only force of the revolutionary process: he calls the upsurge of the Third World an "inevitable

trend" of its struggle, separating it from the struggle of the world proletariat ("Hungchi," No. 5, p. 23). While acknowledging the "great contribution to human progress" made by the peoples of these three continents, he emphasizes the "common" fate and revolutionary traditions of these peoples and of China.

The historical role of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America indeed calls for the highest tribute. But the point is that Shih Chun pays such tribute in an affected manner and not with honest intentions; his aim is, first, to isolate these peoples from the socialist community, and, secondly, to provide a "historical basis" for China's hegemony among the "revolutionary peoples of the world." He writes: "A knowledge of world history can help us to understand more correctly that the people of our country and the oppressed peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America have a common historical fate, and that we are faced with the common task of combating imperialism; and therefore we shall consistently pursue the revolutionary line of Chairman Mao in foreign relations with still greater consciousness..." ("Hungchi," No. 4, p. 18, emphasis added). Thus the "common" fate of the peoples of the three continents and China is presented in Maoist literature as a historical precondition for the "consistent pursuance of the Mao line," that is, for the implementation of the great-power policy of the Maoist leadership.

In this connection we must say frankly that the numerous declarations made recently by Chinese propaganda and Chinese diplomats at

the United Nations about "China belonging to the Third World" seem rather strange, to say the least. For it is obvious that China is not a Third World country as regards its essence and the veiled but commonly known claims of its leaders to political and ideological supremacy in that world. Underlying these claims, which became increasingly open during the "cultural revolution," are the remnants of the great-Han attitudes of the feudal period, and the notion (cultivated for "internal consumption") about the alleged former vassalage of most Asian countries to China and about the racial superiority of the Chinese over all other nations.

Thus Shih Chun demands a "study of history" (and gives an "example" of how this should be conducted) for the sole reason of drawing the following conclusions: namely, that at one pole there are the "two superpowers" (thereby the basic difference between the two systems — capitalism and socialism — is erased), and at the other — the Third World and China with its "historically predetermined" guiding mission; and that the tendency of world development consists in the "struggle against the two superpowers," which, it is claimed, has the features of a "historical law."

Shih Chun directs all his efforts, notably in the third article, toward creating an impression that the thesis about the death of imperialism being historically inevitable is applicable to world socialism as well. He describes the history of the development and decline of the British Empire as a "mirror reflecting the destiny of contemporary imperialism and social-imperialism" (No. 4, p. 17).

Shih Chun and his ideological inspirers hint that by "social-imperialism" they mean only one superpower — the Soviet Union, and that they are talking about its downfall. Thus, first, one can once again see that the Maoists link the realization of their great-power designs primarily with the undermining of the Soviet Union's positions. And, secondly, anti-Sovietism is regarded by them only as the most effective method of undermining and eliminating world socialism as a whole — a method that accords with Mao's instructions to "hit on the head so that the rest collapses by itself." Is it not clear, then, that China's attempts to disunite the USSR and the other socialist countries are a monstrous encroachment upon the interests and positions of world socialism?

The analysis of the historical process, as done by the Maoists, becomes a revision of the conclusions of the world communist movement on the nature of the present epoch and its chief contradiction.

Life itself corroborates the general conclusions of Communists that the present epoch confirms Lenin's conception of a single revolutionary process, of closer unity and interaction in the anti-imperialist struggle of such tremendous forces as the world socialist system, the international working class and the national liberation movement. The decisive influence of today's leading force — the world socialist system — on the social development of mankind is also becoming increasingly clear. To further their great-power ambitions expressed in their strategy of anti-Sovietism, the Maoists distort the principal contradiction of our time, maintain that world

socialism is not one of the revolutionary forces of today, reduce these forces to the national liberation movement and insist on a confrontation between the latter and world socialism. While formally extolling the national liberation movement, they are actually undermining it, for they are trying to split the unity of the basic revolutionary forces of today, opposing them to one another, diverting the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America from the battle against colonialism and imperialism, and setting these peoples against their main allies and comrades-in-arms. In revising the fundamental conclusions of the world communist movement and extending the front of struggle against world socialism, the Maoists are in effect rejecting a number of their own concepts.

In their "Proposals on the General Line of the International Communist Movement" of June 14, 1963, the Maoists still called "the contradiction between the socialist and imperialist camps" the foremost contradiction of our time. The Ninth Congress of the CPC, which departed from that stand, considered the principal contradiction of the present epoch to be "the contradiction between the oppressed nations, on the one hand, and imperialism and social-imperialism, on the other."

As can be seen, the definition of the principal contradiction of our time has been entirely revised and made to fit the great-power strategy of the Maoists; it in fact reflects the main trend of that strategy — anti-Sovietism, and provides for the means of realizing it on which Peking puts its main stake — the use of the Third World. Apparently, the Maoist leadership be-

believes that the time has come to prop up the blatantly nationalistic ideas underlying such "theoretical" conclusions with the authority of world history. This is exactly what Shih Chun sets out to do when he tries to prove to other nations that China must be regarded as the sole universal "model" of socialism.

In falsifying history, Shih Chun does his utmost to distort the role and place of the Soviet Union in the world historical process, and to obliterate its universally recognized contribution to the peoples of the whole world, including the Chinese people. For example, he does not say anything about the heroic feat of international historical significance performed by the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, who saved humanity from fascist enslavement. In speaking of the Great October Socialist Revolution, which he refers to several times (he cannot possibly avoid doing that), he gives the impression that the entire history of socialism in the Soviet Union had ended with the revolution. What is more, he indulges in vile slander against the USSR and rehashes the themes of the most rabid anti-communist propaganda when he asserts that the Soviet Union "has fully inherited the imperialist traditions of tsarist Russia," and insinuates that it shares its fate ("Hungchi," No. 5, p. 22).

Spilling lies, Shih Chun declares that capitalism is being restored in the country where socialism first triumphed. He blots out the entire half-century history of the Land of Soviets, and his account of the history of the exploitation and oppression of the peoples by imperialism is interspersed with anti-Soviet slander. Falsifica-

tion and distortion are his stock-in-trade. He goes so far as to use Lenin's theory of imperialism as a basis for equating the socio-political and historical laws governing the development of the USA and the USSR. He asserts that the Soviet Union is conducting an imperialist policy (which he says is simply an "extension" of the policy of tsarist Russia), and depicts the USSR as a country whose internal evolution is determined by the laws of development of imperialism.

Shih Chun's attempts are most pitiful. To begin with, in his interpretation the Leninist theory of imperialism is distorted and vulgarized. No attention whatever is given to the major theses concerning the economic motives and the essence of imperialism (as is the case with works by bourgeois theorists and "critics" of Marxism). The Maoists have their reasons for doing this. Their evaluation of the USSR through the prism of the theory of imperialism is an absurdity, but a study of the economic aspect of the problem, especially of the USSR's relations with the Third World, and of the social trend of the Soviet economic policy, would demolish Peking's absurd assertions utterly. Let us note, by the way, that the "revised" policy of Peking towards the USA has compelled the Maoists to show some restraint in evaluating the role of American imperialism as world exploiter.

The concept of "the two superpowers" as presented by Shih Chun actually implies a demand for taking up an opposition against the USSR. To impress this idea on the reader, he resorts to the typical Maoist method of juggling

with quotations from the classics of Marxism-Leninism and cites Lenin's thesis that without combating opportunism the struggle against imperialism is "an empty phrase or a fraud" (No. 6, p. 39). Since by "opportunism" the Maoists mean the Soviet Union, it turns out that Shih Chun needs the authority of Lenin in calling for an immediate battle against the state established by Lenin. Shih Chun's fight against the "superpowers," which he equates with the fight for the "revolution," for the "consolidation of socialism," is actually an effort directed mainly at destroying socialism as it exists in the USSR and other socialist countries.

Another reason why Shih Chun turns to the history of imperialism is that he wants to "justify" the Maoist strategy which counts on a "big war" between the Soviet Union and the United States. He does this by making an "analysis" of the "basic contradictions" in modern and contemporary history, singling out from them only one — "the contradiction between the imperialists and the struggle among them" (No. 5, p. 20). He depicts modern and contemporary history as a period of struggle between the "great colonial countries and imperialist powers." He regards the policies of these powers as the prototype of the present policies of the USA and the USSR, and describes the relations between them as "an imperialist predatory alliance" and a "fight for hegemony"; he recommends a study of the history of Britain for a better understanding of the "agreement and the struggle" between the USSR and the USA ("Hungchi," No. 6, p. 36), and of the "history of American imperialism and tsarist imperialism."

This, he says, "will prove very helpful in studying the struggle between the two superpowers for world domination today and other international issues. Because of the nature of imperialism, their collusion will be constantly maintained, while the fight between them to achieve world domination is irreconcilable" ("Hungchi," No. 5, p. 22).

In dealing with modern and contemporary history, Shih Chun invents another "historical law" according to which a clash between the USSR and the USA is "inevitable." Shih Chun's aim is to persuade the peoples to act in conformity with this "law" and to justify the Maoist policy of whipping up international tension and provoking a Soviet-American conflict.

The peculiar logic of Shih Chun's articles reflects the logic of "historical thought" of those whose ideas are expressed in them.

As shown above, according to Shih Chun, world socialism and the working class do not exist as active historical forces, and socialism beyond the borders of China is "vanishing." He writes that with the October 1917 Revolution "modern history (emphasis added) entered its third stage" (the first stage — from the Revolution of 1640 in England to the Paris Commune of 1871, and the second stage — from 1871 to the October Revolution of 1917). At this stage "socialism and people's democracy all over the world" are only "on the way to their victory" ("Hungchi," No. 5, p. 18). It thus follows that mankind has yet to be made happy by a "genuine" socialist revolution, and that "genuine" contemporary history is yet to be

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written as China "makes even greater contribution to the cause of humanity" ("Hungchi," No. 4, p. 16).

Under the guise of "China's contribution to the cause of humanity" and its "service to the world revolution," the idea of "China's greatness" is being peddled. "World revolution" becomes another name for "Chinese hegemony."

It is not by chance that the Maoists, while following their course, pay special attention to historical "research."

It has been a tradition in China to make wide use of history (or the falsification of history, to be more precise) to spread Sinocentric conceptions; the voluminous chronicles of the Chinese dynasties are an evidence of this. Proceeding from positions of Sinocentrism, the Maoists have inherited the practice of falsifying history.

They have long been distorting historical facts in various fields in order to fabricate "historical laws" in line with their ideas. Falsification of history is a method of their political manoeuvres. An example of this is the special decision of the CPC Central Committee, drawn up by Mao Tse-tung and adopted in April 1945, which calls for a complete revision of the Party's history in conformity with the personality cult of Mao and with the absolutization of his "line." The latest effort in that direction was an article on the 50th anniversary of the founding of the CPC ("Jenmin jihpao," July 1, 1971).

In the 1950s there were many campaigns in China extolling Jenghiz Khan. Later, Han Ju-lin, a historian, praised him for "demolishing forty states," and described the cruelties and

crimes of the medieval Khan as a "boon" to the conquered peoples because he had enabled them to "broaden their outlook." Han Ju-lin admitted that the "demolition of forty states was impossible without bloodshed and devastation," but, on the other hand, he said, Jenghiz Khan did away with those who "kept their peoples within narrow boundaries" and enabled them to "participate in mutual economic and cultural exchange" ("Lishih Yanchiu," No. 3, 1962, pp. 9-10).

Curiously, a conqueror who shed blood in China, too, is glorified by the Maoists. They seem ready to include even the enslaver of their own people in the pantheon of "national heroes," for they are blinded by that "historical example" of unrestrained expansion beyond "narrow borders" by means of wiping out dozens of states.

Such hegemonistic ideas and Sinocentrism form the keynote of Shih Chun's articles. They differ from earlier falsifications by Maoist historians in that they provide a formula for developing themes of "research" in modern and contemporary history which are to form the groundwork for the foreign policy strategy of the Maoists, with anti-Sovietism as the pivot.

With that end in view, the Maoists resort to distorting facts about world historical development. What is at issue here is not only the fallacious concepts of Shih Chun. The point is that he blots out from history everything that "hampers" the hegemonic programme of Peking. This applies, in particular, to facts which confirm the leading role of socialism in the present-day world.

Shih Chun, for instance, opposes the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America to the European nations on a nationalist and racist basis, and refuses to acknowledge the contribution of the European nations to general historical progress. In other words, he calls for a nihilist, destructive approach to European civilization and culture.

While speaking about the upswing of the national liberation movement with false enthusiasm, Shih Chun shies away from the question of the concrete historical situation and the causes of the upswing, from a Marxist-Leninist analysis of its forms and processes, and from the fact that the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the help of the Comintern, and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries played the decisive role in ensuring the success of the Chinese revolution. Shih Chun speaks about days long gone by, while passing over present-day developments in silence. It is not by chance that he does this, since the Maoist approach to the national liberation movement is selfish, hegemonic and sometimes downright treacherous. One may recall the Chinese leaders' siding with those who tried to strangle one of the biggest national liberation movements of recent years, waged by the people of East Pakistan near the border of China.

For the same reasons Shih Chun extols the role of Asia without mentioning the great Asian country — India (except in direct connection with the October 1917 Revolution in Russia). For the same reasons he talks about the "struggle of the Latin American countries for the establishment

of a 200-mile coastal zone," but has nothing to say about the victory of the Cuban revolution, the advent of socialism in the Western Hemisphere.

In Shih Chun's articles there are quite a few high-flown but essentially misleading statements, like the following: "Millions of slaves are those who are moving history forward, who are making possible progress in science and culture." One may say that here Maoism reveals its true face. It seems to appeal to the oppressed masses, presenting itself as their defender, and flattering them, but actually it tries to distract their attention from the struggle of the two systems and to exploit the energies of the working people to further its unpopular policy. This is borne out by the entire course of events in China over the last ten-odd years. Besides, the identification of the mass of the people with slaves follows from the cult of Mao with its psychology of humiliating the masses, which is also characteristic of the cult of the deified Chinese emperors of the past.

Among the "scientific discoveries" of the Peking historians one may also include their contentions that the French bourgeois revolution, which began in 1789, continued for more than 80 years, and that the American revolution which began in 1775 lasted nearly a century. "Only through such prolonged struggle did the bourgeoisie of these countries succeed in consolidating their domination." Such ignorant statements may have been designed to obliterate the basic differences between socialist and bourgeois revolutions, and to make the uninformed think that all revolutionary changes take time to come

about, thereby justifying the stagnant "historical situation" in China.

Such arguments, like the entire content of the articles under consideration, show that the Maoist interpretation of the historical process is totally unscientific. In following their anti-socialist, chauvinist and adventurist policy, the Maoists are obviously resorting to wholesale falsehood. Thus, in Shih Chun's articles there is more pseudo-revolutionary effusiveness than concrete historical analysis.

The articles emphasize again and again the idea that Mao Tse-tung has "inherited, upheld and developed Marxism-Leninism." To back up this dogmatic assertion Shih Chun refers to Mao's "well-known theoretical proposition that imperialism and all reactionaries are paper tigers." This proposition, which Mao himself called "strategic," delights the Peking pseudo-historians who declare "the judgement of Chairman Mao our powerful ideological and political weapon for achieving victory over imperialism."

It requires no effort to see that this "theory," which has nothing to do with a genuine scientific exposition of the essence of imperialism, on the one hand, gives rise to adventurism because it ignores the objective conditions of the anti-imperialist struggle, and, on the other, leads ultimately to capitulatory views and positions because it substitutes empty slogans for real struggle against imperialism. The Peking falsifiers have reason to be satisfied with this kind of clumsy philosophy of history: it relieves them of the necessity to analyze the actual course of the world revolutionary process, to show its motive forces and study the class struggle in all its con-

crete manifestations. In the hands of the Peking leadership, this apology for Mao's "theory" has long been used to nudge other countries and peoples towards risky ventures and also to justify the Maoist policy of flirting with imperialism.

The Maoist Concept of World History and the True History of the Peoples of the East

F. Belcl'yubsky

The need to study and understand the past of mankind has been proclaimed many a time and for different purposes in present-day China. Back in 1953, one of the former leaders of the PRC Academy of Sciences, Liu Ta-nien, observed that Chinese scholarship in the field of world history was lagging behind. But work in that field was being hampered from above. For example, in 1956, Hsiang Ta, a specialist in international relations in the Middle Ages, was declared a "Right element" for proposing to broaden the themes of scholarly research. In March 1958, the prominent historian Chian Po-tsan proposed "that in the near future, through collective efforts, college courses be set up on the history of China, Asia and Africa, and on world history." The leading historical journal "Lishih Yanchiu" did not publish the text of his

proposal. This shows the negative attitude of those who direct the study of history in China to such ideas. In 1963, the Deputy Director of the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the CPC Central Committee, Chou Yang, said: "We cannot be satisfied with the use of textbooks on world history written by foreign scholars. We must subject to serious and objective criticism the distortions of world history by bourgeois historians and by foreign contemporary revisionists."¹ But even this proposal, which is perfectly orthodox by Maoist standards, was criticized three years later for showing "servility towards the West." During the "cultural revolution" Liu Ta-nien, Chian Po-tsan, and Chou Yang, following Hsiang Ta, all disappeared from the political and scholarly scene. For a long time it was extremely unsafe to suggest the study of world history.

That this circumstance is not accidental becomes apparent when one examines the sum total of Mao Tse-tung's views. Back in May 1930, he wrote in his work "Against Book-Worship": "A bookish approach to the study of the social sciences is extremely dangerous and may even lead to the path of counter-revolution . . . Many Communists who shut themselves up in the world of books when studying social sciences became counter-revolutionaries one after another." And here for the first time he advanced the principle of dividing knowledge into "useful" and "useless" knowledge: "We do need books, but book-worship divorced from reality

¹ Chou Yang, *The Vital Tasks of Social Scientists*, Peking, 1963, p. 68.

must be overcome.”¹ In his speech, “Reform Our Study” (May 1941), Mao Tse-tung more clearly expressed his attitude to theory: “Youths who have hardly reached seventeen or eighteen years of age are forced to cram ‘Capital’ and ‘Anti-Dühring.’ Thus an anomalous mentality has been created among a number of our students: they have little interest in studying Chinese problems and take the directives of the Party lightly ...” In the following years Mao Tse-tung more than once expressed a negative attitude to theoretical, “bookish” learning. “The intelligentsia has a tail on which a tub of cold water should be poured,” he said on March 20, 1957. A year later he reiterated his favourite idea at the Chengtu conference: “Many of our comrades quail before the professors ... They do not fear the imperialists, but they fear the professors. Extraordinary!” For twenty years China’s secondary and higher schools had no systematic courses on world history and no standard textbooks on the subject. Thus a deliberate policy of lowering the cultural level of the nation was pursued.

In the spring of 1972, the appeal to study world history rang out anew in the pages of “Hungchi.”

The editorial board of “Hungchi” turned to the experience of world history at a time when the Peking leadership, having suffered a series of foreign policy setbacks and faced with domestic instability, had shifted to a policy of

¹ Mao Tse-tung. *Against Book-Worship*, Peking, 1966, pp. 4-5.

manoeuvring on the international scene. But such a policy requires a theoretical foundation, it can no longer rest on the endless repetition of such slogans as “revolutionary war,” “a single world revolutionary front,” and “an offensive by the world village on the world town.” What new contribution have the “Hungchi” articles by Shih Chun made to the study of world history and to the foreign policy doctrine of Maoism?

The editorial staff of “Hungchi” remain true to Maoism’s narrow approach to all branches of knowledge. That is why less than one page (out of a total of fifteen) of Shih Chun’s articles is devoted to ancient and medieval history: “The overthrow of the old and the rise of the new social system takes place through a great revolution ... That is why they are always accompanied by a class struggle of tremendous scope and great changes. This is characteristic of every major critical period in the history of mankind. During the disintegration of the slave-holding system in the West, there were slave uprisings in various parts of the Roman Empire. Invasions by foreign tribes followed one after another; internecine wars alternated with wars against other peoples. During the disintegration of the world feudal system the storm of the world bourgeois revolution swept over Europe and the American continent. Nearly two centuries of great upheavals followed, during which period numerous civil wars and wars between states raged at different times in different places; feudalism was restored and again overthrown; monarchies and republics appeared” (“Hungchi,” No. 4, p. 17). Thus we see that in “Hungchi”’s approach to history the theory of the class

struggle is divorced from the Marxist-Leninist theory of the stage-by-stage development of society, and the progressive nature of society's transition from one formation to another is disregarded. It is no mere chance that Shih Chun fails to mention the special revolutionary role of the bourgeoisie in the period of modern history, and the significance of large-scale industry and the world market as the material basis for the rise and subsequent downfall of capitalism — a fact noted in the "Manifesto of the Communist Party." He regards the class struggle as a non-historical, eternal law. What is more, he systematically identifies it with the struggle of nations. In effect he presents us with a variant of social Darwinism — the doctrine of the inevitable struggle for existence in human society.

Curiously, all Shih Chun has to say about the history of Asia, Africa and Latin America before the 15th century is: "World history tells us that the continents of Asia and Africa are the cradle of human civilization. Asia, Africa and Latin America — each of them has a brilliant ancient civilization of its own and has made a great contribution to the progress of mankind" ("Hungchi," No. 4, p. 18).

Indeed, no struggle against racism and colonialism is possible without an understanding of the contribution of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America to world culture. But it is also true that the struggle is impossible without a correct understanding of the role played by the progressive forces of Europe, above all the proletariat, in fighting racism and colonialism. "Hungchi" is surprisingly indifferent to the true history of the civilization of these three conti-

nents. There is a nationalistic tendency underlying Shih Chun's treatment of the subject; this is seen in the fact that he fails to discover operation of the law of class struggle there before the 15th century (he didn't even find space for the usual Maoist apology of peasant wars), or of the law of uneven historical development (the basic laws of social development in his opinion). That is why the areas covering today's Third World are not mentioned in the description of the first two class formations. Shih Chun does not apply social laws to their past development. Thus, according to his interpretation of history, there are two worlds: the West torn by class struggle, revolutions and wars, and the East peacefully making its "great contribution to the progress of mankind."

Finally, says Shih Chun, a change came about: "From the 15th century on, the intrusion of Western colonialism hampered the development of vast areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America which were turned into colonies and semi-colonies. They all were subjected to cruel exploitation and enslavement by the Western colonialists" ("Hungchi," No. 4, p. 18). This thesis is not new. Back in 1961, repeating a favourite thesis of historians under the Kuomintang regime, the Chinese historian Chou Ku-cheng wrote: "Up to the 15th century the leading place in world history was held by the Asian peoples, i.e. people of the yellow race; after the 15th century it gradually went over to the Europeans, i.e. people of the white race."¹ Later the works of Chou

¹ Chou Ku-cheng. *Universal History without the Principle of Universality*, in *Historical Science in the PRC*, p. 259.

Ku-cheng were severely criticized for denying the role of the class struggle. But his racialist views were not criticized. Thus, the replacement of class-based criticism of racialism and colonialism by "Asiacentrism" which is found in the writings of an old scholar having no Party affiliation, has now become China's official ideological platform. Shih Chun's articles make no mention of the colour of the skin of the conquerors and the conquered, but they contain the same thesis: the backwardness of the East is due to Western colonialism. However, the military victories of the Western colonialists were made possible by the high level of productive forces, by the early maturation of capitalist relations in Europe. Colonial expansion did not take place all at once. It extended over a period of four centuries, for it came up against the heroic resistance of the peoples of Asia and Africa. It was not until the middle of the 19th century that the aggressors gained an advantage by utilizing the achievements of the industrial revolution.

In the countries of the East, on the other hand, the Ch'ing, Kajar, Mogul, Ottoman and other dynasties, relying on the centralized state apparatus, hampered the development of society, cultivated early feudal and pre-feudal forms of social relations, drained the energy of the peoples by waging predatory wars, destroyed the productive forces, and suppressed social thought. The feudal elite in most of the Asian and African countries proved incapable of comprehending the historical tasks of their time, of preserving the independence of their countries. They betrayed their peoples. It is therefore not surpri-

sing that most of the Asian dynasties ended up as tools of foreign capital.

China became a semi-colony comparatively late. Its socio-economic backwardness, which manifested itself in the "opium war" period, clearly shows the falseness of the contention that the West and the East developed evenly before the intrusion of the colonial powers. Despite the nationalist argument that the "opium war" demonstrated that the "decisive factor in the outcome of war is man, not weapons," the facts are otherwise. The policy of isolation pursued by the Ch'ing dynasty disarmed the people in the face of aggressors. The ruling clique above all was caught unprepared. In official Chinese documents Holland, Portugal, France, Denmark and England were listed among the tributaries of China, along with Siam and Korea. That is why the officials took English aggression for "a revolt of barbarians." High officials under the Ch'ing Emperor were ill-informed about their enemy. Let us cite two examples. Niu Chiang, Governor of the Hunan province, on visiting a British steamboat, was surprised to find that its paddle wheels were rotated by engines, not by bulls. Lin Tseh-hsu, Governor General of Kwangtung and Kuangsi, wrote to Queen Victoria: "Without such goods as tea and rhubarb foreigners cannot live a day. How will they live if we suddenly become sparing and stop helping them in their misfortune? . . . Foreigners cannot turn yarn into fabric if they do not receive silk cocoons from us." Complete lack of information about the enemy hastened the defeat of China. In the summer of 1840 the consequences of pursuing a policy of isolation over a period of one

and a half century became painfully clear. The 4,000-strong army of the aggressors failed to conquer that vast country. The British were following an adventurist plan designed to intimidate the Chinese and seize strategic bases on the Chinese coast. The plan succeeded owing to the extreme weakness of the defenders. The tiny Chinese junks, armed at best with a dozen canons,¹ were no match for the 74-gun British battleships. The rate of fire, the range and accuracy of the armament of the defenders at the coastal fortifications were much lower than those of the British. The military command proved to be absolutely helpless.

Thoughtful men in China soberly appraised the results of the invasion and felt the national humiliation keenly. Sun Yat-sen wrote: "The isolationism and haughtiness of China have a long history ... And although the state of isolation was broken 60-70 years ago, the views of the Chinese have not changed and still resemble those of a lonely man abandoned on a desert island."² In his poem "The Great Wall" Lu Hsun wrote:

"The stonework consists of old bricks reinforced at a later date by new bricks. These have combined to make a wall that hems us in.

"When shall we stop reinforcing the Great Wall with new bricks?

¹ Chinese laws prohibited the building of large ships. See *Taiping Kurun i Wuhori Kuoli*, or *All the Laws and Enactments of the Chinese (Now Manchurian) Government*, Vol. 2, St. Petersburg, 1781, p. 47.

² Sun Yat-sen, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1964, p. 251.

"A curse on this wonderful Great Wall!"¹ And in one of the works of Kuo Mo-jo which were consigned to the flames by the author himself we find these lines: "We shall cry out with a voice of storm and thunder; with the violence of an erupting volcano we shall attack everything that has had its day and is rotten to the core." But Shih Chun zealously defends everything that "has had its day and is rotten to the core," and attacks what the Chinese people themselves have said about their distress. In so doing he is trying to patch the Great Wall anew.

"Hungchi"'s unreservedly positive appraisal of the pre-colonial past (not only of China, but of the three continents as a whole) seems to be something new. But it is not unexpected, for Shih Chun's conclusions follow from more than a decade of idealization of conquering emperors, and from the revival of certain medieval political practice (one need only think of the cult of Mao Tse-tung). Abandonment of the democratic and Marxist tradition of objective criticism of feudal society can be seen in the article "Patriotism or National Betrayal?"² by one of the pioneers of the "cultural revolution," Chi Pen-yu, and it is confirmed in the articles by Shih Chun.

The idealization of a bygone period of independence inevitably leads to an erroneous appraisal of the objective consequences of capitalist intrusion. The historically progressive process of building a world economy, of destroying the primitive-communal and feudal systems was

¹ *Selected Works of Lu Hsun*, Peking, 1957, Vol. 2, p. 151.

² *Jenmin jihpao*, April 1, 1967.

a process which involved violence and the use of force. Whole nations became its victims. It greatly enhanced the unevenness of the development of the West and the enslaved countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, turning the national property and human resources of the peoples of the three continents into one of the sources of primary accumulation of capital in Europe and North America. The bourgeoisie introduced particularly monstrous, intensive forms of non-economic coercion — slavery and bondage. It formed an alliance with the most reactionary social forces on those continents so as to preserve the backwardness of the conquered nations, to lower the cost of labour power there, and secure the conditions for unequal trade and plunder. For example, the staunchly conservative, anti-national policy of the Chinese and Manchurian feudals (backed by the colonialists) in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was one of the circumstances that accounted for the protracted and painful nature of the revolutionary struggle waged by the Chinese people.

But, on the other hand, the capitalist class, while seeking to obtain maximum profits, in spite of its will created the objective conditions for abolishing colonialism. Lenin said: "One of the main features of imperialism is that it accelerates capitalist development in the most backward countries, and thereby extends and intensifies the struggle against national oppression. That is a fact, and from it inevitably follows that imperialism must often give rise to national wars."¹ On the economic level, the colonies and

¹ Lenin. Collected Works, Vol. 23, p. 78.

semi-colonies developed a colonial and, in some cases, a capitalist mode of production, an internal market and new productive forces; on the state level, centralization was achieved on formerly disjointed subject territories; on the social level, new classes and strata emerged: a proletariat, a petty bourgeoisie, a national bourgeoisie and an intelligentsia capable of leading the liberation movement of small producers; and on the political and ideological levels, national consciousness was awakened, and the masses joined the organized national liberation movement.

"Hungchi" takes a negative attitude to the results of the establishment of the world capitalist system and prefers the social systems that preceded it historically. But actually capitalism had prepared the objective conditions for the transition to a classless society in several countries. Only after the emergence of the world socialist system was it possible for many backward peoples to go over to socialism, by-passing the capitalist stage of development.

Pride in one's ancient civilization, the desire to restore the historical continuity disrupted by foreign invasions, and hatred for the colonialists, which are characteristic of the revolutionaries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, are perfectly understandable. But the revolutionary fervour of the patriots of the Third World countries (who are often not acquainted with Marxism), on which "Hungchi" tries to capitalize, is not enough without a scientific understanding of the paths of social development, and without a sober evaluation of the pre-colonial past, of the social consequences of capitalist expansion, and of the

objective conditions for overthrowing imperialist oppression and for future development.

In opposing the East to the West without analyzing their continuous and countless contacts, their clashes and mutual enrichment, "Hungchi" is only reviving the old reactionary Pan-Asiatism and the thesis about "proletarian nations" and "bourgeois nations," advanced by the German and Italian fascists. In its pages world history is reduced to the rivalry between the "super-powers," to the struggle of nations for hegemony. It takes place in a vacuum where there is no development of productive forces, culture, ideology, and society as a whole. In the history expounded by Shih Chun one can discern no constructive, positive principle.

Instead of the term "international working class movement" Shih Chun systematically uses such ambiguous expressions as "the revolutionary peoples of the whole world" and "the oppressed nations of the colonial countries," behind which lies the denial of the historical role of the international proletariat. In some specific contexts the Maoists may refer to the working class of a country as part of its "revolutionary people," but, according to "Hungchi," it is not and cannot be part of the world working class movement. It is thus suggested that the working class of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America should not strive for hegemony in the national liberation movement. The failure to mention the world socialist system and the role of the international proletariat, and the characterization of the imperialists as the sole rulers of their countries, are not a tactical move which the Maoists have been com-

pelled to take because of the negative attitude of the international working class movement to Maoist slogans or because of the Maoist exaggeration of the capitalists' strength at the present time; they represent a strategic line based on the myth about "proletarian nations" and "exploiter nations."

Shih Chun says that the might of the imperialists is due only to their incomes from colonial plunder. This is far from being the truth. The entire Third World accounts for a mere two per cent of the sale of goods from the developed industrial capitalist countries. In the period 1902-12 the incomes from colonial plunder amounted to 23-26 per cent of the total incomes of the capitalists of Western Europe and the USA; today the figure is two per cent. Highly productive labour is for capital a more profitable object of exploitation than labour in the backward countries, where its efficiency is extremely low. That is why the proletariat is interested in abolishing both the bourgeoisie and the remnants of the colonial system, which remain important as reserves of world capitalism. On their part, the peoples of the Third World are suffering under the yoke of the imperialists, who are extorting from them sums equal to half their annual gross accumulation. It is the struggle against imperialism that forms the objective basis for the co-operation of the socialist countries, the proletariat in the capitalist countries and the national liberation movement. By ignoring the internal reserves of imperialism (the increasing rate of exploitation of the workers, the consolidation of the state's role, militarization, automation, expansion of the

internal market, and so on) "Hungchi" can only confuse the patriots of the three continents and it makes the real "iron tigers" of imperialism look like "paper tigers."

The Maoists deny the fact that capitalism is developing unevenly in the Third World. But, as Marx and Engels foresaw in the middle of the 19th century, the capitalist elements there are "in the ascendent."¹ To overcome this tendency, some nations of the Third World have chosen the path of non-capitalist development. The specific features of the bourgeois-democratic stage of the national liberation revolution, which were correctly understood by the first generation of Chinese Marxists, are not mentioned in the articles by Shih Chun.

"Hungchi" also rejects the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on two cultures in societies with class antagonisms. On three occasions Shih Chun mocks at the decline of Britain, on whose possessions "the sun never used to set," but he says not a word about the vigorous opposition of the British working class to the chauvinistic boasting of the British ruling class. The English Chartists, for example, noted that unfortunately it was only too true that there was no corner in the world where Britain had not planted her blood-stained flag.

For anti-Soviet purposes, Shih Chun kindles anti-Russian sentiments by harping once again on the imaginary territorial losses of China, and calls tsarist Russia the "gendarme of Asia" (No. 6, p. 34). The tsarist camarilla did include

¹ Marx and Engels. *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 111.

adventurists who wanted to become the gendarmes of Asia, but they failed to wrest that role from the British capitalists. In his article "Events in the Balkans and in Persia" Lenin dealt with the European powers which, he said, "are helping Russia play the gendarme in Asia." From that article Shih Chun took only three words: Russia, gendarme, Asia; he makes no mention of the "combined power of the crowned bandits and international capital," or, what is most important, Lenin's call: "Down with all colonial policy."¹

Has Russia ever been an enemy of China at all? In 1858, the Russian journal "Sovremennik" (The Contemporary) published a translation of the proclamation of the Taiping rebels, and in 1862, N. G. Chernyshevsky published in that journal a speech by the British parliamentarian J. Bright denouncing the British intervention in China (Marx approved of Bright's anti-colonialist activity). For Chernyshevsky that was the only way of protesting in the censored press against the plans for aggression against China.

And it should be noted that not only gendarmes came from Russia to Asia. More than four hundred volunteers from Transcaucasia defended the freedom of Iran from the troops of the tsar and the shah in 1908-11. Sixteen Russian revolutionaries were burnt alive by the shah's executioners. The working class of Russia strongly protested against the adventuristic policy of the autocracy in the Far East. Iranian fidais learned the tactics of barricade fighting in Russia, Indian patriots studied the method

¹ Lenin. *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 227, p. 229.

of mass strikes there. The revolutionaries of Asia eagerly learned from the experience of their Russian counterparts. No wonder the second and third issues of "Minpao," the journal of Chinese revolutionary democracy, carried the portraits of Sofia Perovskaya and Mikhail Bakunin on their front pages. The difference between official Russia and progressive Russia was understood by Lu Hsun, who said: "Of course we knew that tsarist Russia was invading China, but Russian literature taught us the important lesson that there are two sorts of men in the world: the exploiters and the exploited."¹ And it is not by chance that Sun Yat-sen kept up a correspondence with N. K. Sudzilovsky, a Narodnik, for the revolutionary movement in Russia had from the outset influenced the East owing to its democratic character. And finally, can one speak about the fate of the revolution in Asia, as "Hungchi" does, without referring to the role of the Great October Socialist Revolution?

According to Shih Chun, China is a part of the Third World, but not of the socialist camp (No. 4, p. 24). To forge Afro-Asian "unity" on a nationalist basis he is ready to pass over in silence even the peasant movement in feudal China and thus also the class struggle in pre-colonial Asia. What programme, then, does "Hungchi" propose to the Third World countries? Shih Chun writes: "We must not suppose that one fine day the peoples of the world will be able to do away with imperialism for good

without an extremely difficult, complex and prolonged struggle. However, if the peoples of the whole world fight boldly and skilfully, for a long time and with determination, the downfall of imperialism and the triumph of the popular revolution are inevitable. Today states are striving for independence, nations are fighting for emancipation, and peoples are for revolution. This has become an irresistible trend of history. Imperialism will not last too long now. To win victory in revolutions, the people of every country of the world will have to traverse the winding path of a hard struggle" (No. 6, p. 34). Is that all? Struggle is of course needed, but what are its objectives? Here a programme of social changes is lacking; the purpose of revolution is reduced to the achievement of national independence. The apology of the pre-colonial past, with which Shih Chun's series of articles begins, suggests that the social ideals of "Hungchi" are to be found in ancient times.

Shih Chun's articles have two aspects, and one of them is turned to the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America. They clearly show that the object of Maoist propaganda in the Third World is the classes and social groups connected with the pre-capitalist mode of production.

In their attempt to exert influence on these social strata, the Maoists are compelled to throw off their Marxist camouflage and begin criticizing capitalism from egalitarian, downright nationalistic positions. The ideas and views set forth in Shih Chun's articles are intended to isolate the national liberation movement from the socialist community and the world proletariat. Their anti-Soviet bias may mislead

¹ Selected Works of Lu Hsun, Peking, 1959, Vol. 3, p. 181.

developing countries in their search for the correct way of development and their choice of allies. They also dismiss the task of effecting self-criticism in a spirit of truly revolutionary patriotism.

"Hungchi" is trying to convince the Chinese people that the Maoist course is correct by using seemingly scientific arguments. It contributes nothing to an understanding of world history. And it is not concern for knowledge, but a desire to continue by new methods the old policy of misinforming the working people that led it to publish Shih Chun's articles. Falsified "historical examples" serve to incite anti-Sovietism and whip up nationalistic sentiments.

History Falsified to Suit Peking's Great-Power Policy

G. Astafiev, A. Narochitsky

Of late the rulers of the People's Republic of China have been confronted with the need to explain their chauvinistic policy from the Maoist point of view or what they claim to be the Marxist point of view. The present Chinese Communist Party leaders need this ideological "substantiation" to justify their policy in the eyes of the Chinese people, party members and the world communist movement. Furthermore, they are trying to present this policy as a kind of new achievement in theory and they prop it up with quotations from Lenin's works which are taken out of context and divorced from the substance of Lenin's writings, and which are often distorted.

Since the course of history clearly runs counter to the anti-Soviet policy of the Chinese leaders, the Peking propagandists have been

instructed to falsify the whole of world history and to devise a scheme of world historical development from the positions of great-power chauvinism, of the drive for world domination, and anti-Sovietism.

To this end, the Chinese leaders are turning to the study of world history from a pseudo-scientific point of view. A case in point is the series of articles by Shih Chun published by "Hungchi," the theoretical journal of the CPC Central Committee. What Shih Chun tries to do is to manufacture historical evidence to back up the great-power policy of the Peking leadership. "Hungchi" calls for the preparation of popular historical studies in which world history and the history of individual countries would be treated from the positions currently taken by the Chinese leaders. Such studies will no doubt soon appear in large numbers.

But the present policy of the Chinese leaders, which distorts socialist principles from petty-bourgeois nationalistic, subjectivist positions, a thing unnatural in the relations between socialist countries, cannot be substantiated scientifically because it contradicts Marxism-Leninism. The articles by Shih Chun are full of falsifications and unscientific contentions running counter to Marxism-Leninism though couched in pseudo-Marxist political terms.

Unlike similar attempts in the past, the articles by Shih Chun do not declare outright that Mao's ideas are the summit of social thought, putting right the "wrong" tenets of Marxism-Leninism. This blunt approach has been abandoned. Shih Chun even points out the need to study the works of Marx and Lenin, though re-

ferring only to an approved list of four to five books. As to the key principles formulated by the founders of Marxism-Leninism, they are misrepresented and misinterpreted to promote the ambitions of the Chinese leaders. For instance, Marx's thesis on the role of class struggle in history is used by Shih Chun to vindicate the persecution of the Chinese Communists loyal to Marxism-Leninism and to justify the Trotskyite idea of "shake-ups," that is, purges. Such purges are conducted in China for the purpose of ousting true Leninists from the Party who oppose the Peking leaders' great-power, anti-Soviet policy and advocate friendship with the Soviet Union.

It is a Marxist-Leninist principle that the study of history is necessitated by the requirements of class struggle and at the same time reflects this struggle. The Peking propagandists narrow the meaning of this principle by using history to back up China's "special policy" and popularize Mao's "ideas."

Shih Chun asserts that the study of world history is useful only if it enables one "to understand even better and carry out Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line." Thus the proclaimed intention "to make a great contribution to mankind's cause" ("Hungchi," No. 5, p. 24) is actually an attempt to justify the Maoist great-power policy. Mao's works (Shih Chun pays attention to his book "On New Democracy"), alongside the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism, are called a "theoretical compass for the study of modern and contemporary history" ("Hungchi," No. 5, p. 19). In an arrogant manner Shih Chun identifies Mao's

"thought" with the historical experience of the world communist movement. Mao Tse-tung is said to have summed up this experience ("Hungchi," No. 4, p. 20). And it is in order to master Mao's "theory" that it becomes necessary, according to Shih Chun, to study the history of this movement (in the Maoist interpretation, of course).

Shih Chun avoids talking about "Asian" or "Chinese-style" Marxism, and about the special importance of "Chinese revolutionary experience." Evidently, this is done to restore the credibility of the Chinese leaders' policy. This is also explained by the unfavourable reaction in the world revolutionary movement to the attempts of imposing the "Chinese experience" on its various contingents. So, instead of conducting open propaganda of the "Chinese way of revolution" Peking is seeking to impose Mao's ideological leadership on the world communist movement in a roundabout, covert manner.

This pragmatic approach to history as a means for justifying any arbitrary political act has also been reflected in the attempts by Peking propagandists to explain the numerous twists and turns in the Peking leaders' policy and its setbacks by saying that "the path of the revolution is tortuous and advance in the teeth of a complicated struggle is a dialectical law of history," and that "there has never been a revolution in the world in which everything was wonderful after victory" ("Hungchi," No. 5, p. 23).

According to Shih Chun, history serves the sole aim of promoting the Chinese leaders' great-

power ambitions and glorifying Mao Tse-tung and his "ideas." But such contentions are being presented, not according to the old tactics, but in the guise of what is described as an analysis of the laws of history.

After outlining Lenin's theory of imperialism in a rather primitive way, Shih Chun claims with an air of finality that Mao Tse-tung "upheld and carried forward" this theory. As proof he quotes Mao Tse-tung's saying that "imperialism and all reactionaries are paper tigers" ("Hungchi," No. 6, p. 33), a slogan which was aimed at whipping up world tension right up to the point of provoking a world nuclear war.

And this is all Shih Chun has to say about Mao's "contribution" to Lenin's theory of imperialism. However, the articles abound in distortions and falsifications of this theory. Shih Chun quotes Lenin as saying that imperialism is a monopolistic, decaying and moribund capitalism, and goes on to give a narrow definition of imperialism interpreting it as a policy of aggression and plunder. He asserts that "plunder is the essence of imperialism" ("Hungchi," No. 6, p. 34), evidently forgetting that he himself has just said that colonial plunder had taken place long before the imperialist era began.

Shih Chun's analysis of the history of imperialism consists in merely laying stress on the contradictions and struggle between the imperialists, instability of agreements on spheres of influence, and inevitability of imperialist wars as a means of resolving contradictions. In the final analysis it becomes clear that the Peking falsifiers turn to Lenin's theory of imperialism only in order to sell their own counter-revolutionary

idea of struggle against the Soviet Union. What is more, they grossly misrepresent Lenin's teachings on the root causes and essence of opportunism. Lenin once described the opportunists of the Second International as social-imperialists. The Peking propagandists take up this term and use it to slander the Soviet Union, and to undermine the alliance of the three key forces of the world revolutionary movement—the socialist community, the world communist movement and the national liberation movement ("Hungchi," No. 6, p. 39).

In Peking's scheme of modern and contemporary world history the class-oriented approach to events is replaced by a nationalistic great-power approach. The "conception" of world history as outlined in Shih Chun's articles takes no account of the historical mission of the working class and the significance of contemporary proletarian socialist revolutions. Shih Chun ignores the main contradiction of our time—that between socialism and capitalism. For him the great progressive mission of the Soviet Union and other European socialist countries is not part of world history. In fact, to him, modern and contemporary history is the history of national liberation movements only and the motive force of progress is the struggle of the oppressed peoples in the colonies for freedom. And he broadly defines this struggle as "the struggle of medium-size and small states and their peoples against imperialist aggression, interference and plunder" ("Hungchi," No. 5, p. 19). There is no question that the national liberation struggle is important, but Shih Chun's line of reasoning disregards the antagonism

between socialism and imperialism, which is the basic antagonism of our time.

Peking's interpretation of world history and particularly of the history of the world revolutionary movement is extremely narrow. In fact, it is erroneous and is designed to further the political aims of the Peking rulers. Actually, Shih Chun's articles ignore the fundamental distinction between modern and contemporary history, a distinction which is explained by the emergence of the socialist community on the world scene.

What lies behind the approach of the Peking propagandists to dividing world history into periods is an attempt to play down the role of the Soviet Union and blot out the progressive historical role of the USSR and of the entire socialist community. Shih Chun disregards socialism as a powerful force which is exerting an increasing influence on the development of all nations, including China. In his account of world history, socialism has just somehow vanished. And the Soviet Union is misrepresented and described as the successor to tsarist imperialism, carrying on tsarist Russia's colonial policy in a specific form of "social imperialism." This trick of ignoring the world-wide historic importance of the Great October Socialist Revolution serves a definite purpose—that of tying to the Maoist-invented "Soviet social imperialism" tsarist imperialism and presenting the two as a single system of colonial oppression and enslavement of peoples, including those within the Soviet Union. Shih Chun's assertions with regard to the Soviet Union echo the writings of the most reactionary imperialist Sovietologists in the West.

The new scheme of world history devised by Peking is nothing but yet another anti-Soviet and anti-socialist venture to undermine the peoples' faith in socialism and in socialist internationalism, to slander the great friendship of the peoples in the Soviet Union and the progressive role of the USSR in the world.

Peking's theoreticians are trying to erase from the record of history the tremendous impact which the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community have had on contemporary world developments. The members of this community are said to be enslaved by Soviet "social imperialism" and therefore they must fight it. Here, too, the Peking propagandists seem to have linked up with the sworn enemies of socialism in the imperialist countries.

There is no doubt that this scheme of world history and the lies about Soviet "social imperialism" have been invented to cover up the aggressive essence and untenability of Maoist anti-Sovietism. This is the sole purpose of the campaign.

Shih Chun claims, without proof, that tsarist Russia sought world domination and "had captured a large territory belonging to China." When he quotes Lenin, who denounced the tsarist actions in China, Shih Chun distorts his statements outright ("Hungchi," 1972, No. 11, p. 69). In his work "The War in China," written in 1900, Lenin pointed out: "And now the European capitalists have placed their rapacious paws upon China, and the Russian government was almost the first to do so."¹ However, Shih

Chun distorts this statement to make it sound as if tsarist Russia "was the first to place her devil's paws upon China." Shih Chun asserts that this is an exact quotation from Lenin.

But, when Lenin commented on the opium wars, he underlined that it was the Western capitalist powers that first began the colonial plunder of China. In "The War in China" Lenin wrote: "The capitalist governments of Europe have long since been conducting this policy of plunder towards China, and now they have been joined by the autocratic Russian government."¹ Thus, the Peking propagandists distort what Lenin said concerning Russia's policy toward China.

While criticizing tsarist Russia's imperialist policy, Shih Chun passes over in silence the schemes of other imperialist powers, notably Britain, Germany, Japan and the United States, to lock Russia within her land borders and deny her an outlet to the ocean. Shih Chun describes Russia's effort to have secure sea routes as expansionism.

Throughout his account of world history prior to 1917 Shih Chun presents Russia as the main and in fact the only aggressive force, while the annexationist colonial policy of the Western imperialist powers is played down and even pushed into the background although their colonial aggression far exceeded that of tsarist Russia both in terms of territory and the population brought under colonial rule. In this case, too, Peking's would-be historians have joined forces with Western anti-Sovietes and falsifiers of Russian history.

¹ Lenin. Collected Works, Vol. 4, p. 373.

¹ Lenin. Collected Works, Vol. 4, p. 374.

In describing tsarist Russia's aggressive schemes, Shih Chun pursues a definite political aim — to accuse the Soviet Union of having colonial designs ("Hungchi," No. 11, p. 71). The purpose of such tampering with history is to discredit the USSR and the internationalist principles of friendship and co-operation between the peoples of the Soviet Union, and to undermine the tremendous influence the 50-year Soviet experience has had on relations between nations, the experience of the first socialist alliance of nationalities which provides an example of the only fair solution of the nationalities question and of building a new type of fraternal, socialist relations between peoples.

The Peking propagandists also claim that it is the Third World, and not the socialist community, that plays the key role in the struggle against imperialism, saying that the Third World bears the chief burden of this struggle. But since they have no facts to back up this contention, they can only offer quotations from Mao: "The revolutionary storm in Asia, Africa and Latin America is sure to strike a crushing blow at the old world" ("Hungchi," No. 11, p. 73).

Of course, the national liberation movement has played an important role in the struggle against imperialism. No one has ever denied this fact. Communists have always regarded this movement as one of the key reserves of the socialist revolution and an ally of the working class in its struggle for freedom. But Marxism-Leninism has never regarded the national liberation movement as a self-sufficient force and, still less so, as the only revolutionary force,

capable of crushing the "old," that is, the capitalist world.

Shih Chun identifies the national liberation movement with the world proletarian revolution and makes it the basis of the world-wide anti-imperialist revolution. He does not say a word about the significance of the Soviet victory over German nazism and Japanese militarism, or about the vast Soviet assistance to the Chinese people in their liberation struggle against imperialism and domestic reaction. Shih Chun asserts that it was only "under the leadership of Chairman Mao" that "the Chinese people had achieved a great victory in a new democratic revolution and embarked on the socialist road. The peoples of an ever increasing number of countries and regions in Asia, Africa and Latin America are coming to realizing that 'power grows out of the barrel of a gun' and taking the revolutionary road of armed struggle" ("Hungchi," No. 11, p. 70).

Thus, Shih Chun misrepresents the historical essence of the national liberation movement describing it as the implementation of Peking's political line by the oppressed peoples. Disregarding historical facts, he calls the Soviet Union the enemy of the national liberation movement and puts forward the absurd idea that it cannot win without fighting "Soviet neo-colonialism" ("Hungchi," No. 11, p. 71).

Wishing to seize control of the national liberation movement, the Peking leaders are ready to go to any lengths to discredit Soviet economic and military assistance to the developing countries. To this end, the "theory of intermediate zones," designed to mislead the nations of

the world, has been refurbished once again. According to its latest version, there are two "intermediate zones," the first embracing Asian, African and Latin American countries and the second comprising "some main capitalist countries in the West and the East." According to the Maoist propaganda-mongers, these zones are dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union which, as they assert, are locked in a bitter struggle for "world supremacy."

In the meantime, the Chinese leaders are trying to bring together, under their control, all kinds of political forces, even those which are poles apart. To this end, they put forward slogans about setting up the "broadest united front" which is actually spearheaded against the Soviet Union. Peking's propagandists are trying to sell the idea that the countries of the "first intermediate zone," that is, of Asia, Africa and Latin America, should not only support one another but can also join forces with "the second intermediate zone," that is, with the capitalist countries, except the United States. And all this is to be done for the sake of fighting the Soviet Union whom the Peking leaders regard as the main obstacle in the way of their great-power policy. The talk about the "two superpowers" is nothing but a smokescreen to cover up the anti-Sovietism of the present Chinese leaders.

However, the would-be historians in Peking do not only try to achieve anti-socialist and anti-Soviet objectives. A striking feature about their writings is nationalistic Sinocentrism. They actually take up a racist position for they try to set East and West against each other, abandon-

ing the class-oriented approach to world history. They rewrite "modern history" when they say that the West has contributed nothing to world civilization and progress and has taken a path of aggression and oppression all along while the Eastern countries had been highly civilized and developed for thousands of years before they were enslaved by the West. Not a word is said about the domestic reactionary and aggressive forces in the East.

We do not in the least deny the tremendous contribution of the East to world civilization. But we cannot accept a thesis which completely denies the progressive role of the Western nations. This denial on the part of the Peking propagandists is nothing but an attempt to fan differences between East and West on a racist, chauvinistic basis. What Peking wants is to replace the class-oriented Marxist approach by this racist idea and stir up hostility and hatred between nations for the purpose of furthering its own chauvinistic aims and schemes of domination. Moreover, while belittling the contribution of the Western countries to world civilization, Peking also minimizes the role played by the working class of those countries in the world revolutionary struggle both in the past and at the present time.

Although the would-be historians in Peking are compelled to acknowledge that the struggle of the Western working class was a progressive trend in the 19th century, they assert that in the present century the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America are the only revolutionary forces. For ever since the 15th century "they have been raising one revolutionary storm after another

and launching vigorous attacks on the colonialists and imperialists" ("Hungchi," No. 5, pp. 22-23).

This conception completely ignores one of the greatest movements of today — the struggle of the peoples to embark on the socialist road and to build a socialist society and then communism, its highest phase. Shih Chun's articles utterly disregard the historic achievements of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

It seems that the men who have inspired these articles have been in a rage over the progress made by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. They are irked by the fact that the Soviet Union is scoring more and more victories in its effort to reduce world tension, avert the threat of nuclear war and consolidate security both around the world and in separate regions, in particular, in Europe. These men are enraged also because other socialist countries, national democratic parties, national liberation movements and democratic organizations all pay tribute to the Soviet Union's tremendous achievements during the 50 years of its existence.

No pseudo-scientific conceptions of contemporary world history will ever enable the Peking propagandists to mislead the nations of the world. The "Hungchi" articles with their patently untenable theses concerning world history only reveal more clearly than before the great-power and chauvinistic essence of the Peking leaders' policy.

No subjective distortions of history can alter the course of history. The basic interests of the Soviet Union and China call for peace and friendship between them. The Soviet people

want to see the People's Republic of China a prospering socialist country and to work together with her for peace and against imperialism. It is up to the Chinese leaders to decide when this will happen. But nothing will ever compel the Soviet Union to depart from its Marxist-Leninist line, from the course of upholding its national interests and the inviolability of its territory, or from its resolute struggle against the Chinese leaders' splitting activities in the socialist world and in the liberation movement.